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This paper (accepted for publication in the Journal of International Economic Law 15 (2012)) uses the 
term ‘legal methodology’ as referring to the conceptions of the sources and ‘rules of recognition’ of 
law, the methods of interpretation, the functions ad systemic nature of legal systems like internatioal 
economic law (IEL), and their relationships to other areas of law and politics. It begins with discussing 
six competing theories of justice justifying international economic regulation. This overview of 
theories of justice is followed by a discussion of c mpeting moral, economic, political and legal 
conceptions of the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary rules’ of IEL. Due to the ‘dual nature’ of modern legal 
systems resulting from the universal recognition of human rights and of other principles of justice, 
legal positivism, natural law theories, social and policy conceptions of national, transnational and 
international legal systems must be applied in mutually coherent ways. As law and jurisprudence are 
less about ‘truth’ than about ‘institutionalizing public reason’, positive and normative legal arguments 
must respect legitimate ‘constitutional pluralism’ and ‘reasonable disagreement’ about interpretation 
and legal protection of civil, political, economic, social and cultural human rights as relevant context 
for interpreting IEL. The paper explains why, due to ‘globalization’ and the transformation of ever 
more national into transnational public goods, national Constitutions have become ‘partial 
constitutions’ that can no longer protect many public goods without international law and institutions. 
Constitutional and ‘public goods’ theories confirm that the five competing conceptions of IEL must be 
embedded into a multilevel constitutional framework limiting abuses of public and private power in all 
human interactions at national, transnational and international levels. The paper includes case-studies 
illustrating the need for comparative institutional research on which multilevel legal, institutional and 
regulatory approaches protect human rights, other cosmopolitan rights of citizens and related public 
goods most effectively. The obvious ‘governance failures’ in protecting interdependent public goods 
call not only for ‘democratic empowerment’ of citizens by cosmopolitan rights compensating the 
inadequate parliamentary control of multilevel governance by new forms of ‘participatory’, 
deliberative and cosmopolitan democracy. The obvious abuses of ‘Westphalian conceptions’ of 
‘international law among states’ must also be limited by stronger multilevel judicial protection of 
cosmopolitan rights in order to hold governments more accountable for their failures to protect 
interdependent public goods more effectively. 
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METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM  
AND ITS CRITICS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW RESEARCH 
 
Prof. Dr. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann* 
 
The Introduction to the first issue of the Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) in 1998 
emphasized the wish of the editors to promote multi-disciplinary, theoretical as well as practice-
oriented research on international economic law (IEL) understood broadly, i.e. comprising private and 
public, national and international law and practices ‘blending legal analysis with political science, 
economics and other fields’. In the opening essay on What Is International Economic Law? in Volume 
14 (1), S.Charnovitz concluded that IEL – even though it is one of the oldest fields of national and 
international law – has not yet developed a general theory; ‘if there is a way to achieve a conceptual 
unification of IEcL…, it will come from placing individual economic and social actors at the center of 
the analysis of how to maximize market freedom while respecting human dignity’.1 Is it possible to 
share a common methodology for IEL research without a common theory of IEL, of its normative 
value premises, and of multilevel governance of international public goods?2 Legal methodology in 
IEL research remains contested among practitioners and academics also because legal interpretations 
might arrive at different conclusions depending on the respective methodologies applied. The purpose 
of this contribution is to identify methodological research questions and invite future contributors t 
JIEL to engage in more JIEL debate on their respective legal and comparative research met odologies 
so as to stimulate mutual learning and innovation. The term legal methodology is used here as 
referring to the respective conceptions of the sources and ‘rules of recognition’ of law, the methods f 
interpretation, the functions and systemic nature of l gal systems like IEL, and of their relationships to 
other areas of law and politics. 
                                                   
* Associate editor of JIEL; emeritus professor of inter ational and European Law, European University Institute, 
Florence; visiting professor at LUISS University, Rome, and Jiaotong University, Xi’an (China). 
1
 JIEL 14 (2011), at 22. For a new analysis of IEL proceeding from this methodological premise see: 
E.U.Petersmann, International Economic Law in the 21st Century. Constitutional Pluralism and Multilevel 
Governance of Interdependent Public Goods (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012). 
2 Cf. S.R.Ratner/A.M.Slaugther, Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers, in: 
AJIL 93 (1999), 291, who define methodology as ‘the application of a conceptual apparatus or framework – a 
theory of international law – to the concrete problems faced in the international community’ (at 292). 
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Justice in IEL? Six Competing Conceptions 
The main entrance to the WTO’s Centre William Rappard at the Lake of Geneva is flanked by two 
statues representing ‘peace’ and ‘justice’, the two central objectives and justifications of legal systems 
since ancient times. Yet, even though the sculptor ositioned the statues on either side of the entrance 
door in order to remind all people entering the building of the human ideals of justice and peace,3 
hardly any trade lawyer and trade diplomat has ever argued in a GATT/WTO dispute settlement 
proceeding that ‘peace’ and ‘justice’ are among what t e Preamble to the WTO Agreement calls ‘the 
basic principles and objectives underlying this multilateral trading system’. Article 1 of the UN 
Charter and the Preamble of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) recall that 
‘international disputes should be settled by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of 
justice and international law’. The UN Charter provisions on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
not only codified the sources (eg, international conventions, custom, general principles of law) and 
‘rules of recognition’ of international law (eg, recognition by states, ‘civilized nations’, ‘judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists’, cf Article 38 ICJ Statute) as they 
were perceived in 1945; their regulation of the ICJ as ‘the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations’ (Article 92) also reflects the ancient legal traditions of independent, impartial judges 
administering justice by ‘weighing’ the arguments of both sides (justitia holding the scales) and 
enforcing the existing law (justitia holding the sword). The common linguistic core of the legal terms 
jus, judex and justitia (or justice and the designation of judges as Lord Justice) likewise recalls the 
European traditions of recognizing justice as the main objective of law and ‘courts of justice’ as an 
indispensable part of legitimate governance. Ancient Greek law, for example, conceived ‘justice as a 
prerequisite to living a civic life, to living in community’ (Plato); law was defined as ‘participation in 
the idea of justice’.4 In view of the lack of democratic legitimacy of ‘Westphalian conceptions’ of 
‘international law among states’ and of their justification of inhumane, colonial and imperial legal 
practices by ‘the white man’s burden’ (R.Kipling), many scholars propose to substitute the discourse 
on the ‘democratic deficit’ of international organizations and their multilevel governance with a 
discourse on their contribution to transnational justice: In contrast to ‘Westphalian discourse’ focusing 
on rights and obligations of states and democratic dis ourse focusing on parliamentary democracies, 
‘the discourse on justice centres on the people, puts rimary emphasis on power asymmetries and on 
overcoming the obstacles to justifiable political outcomes’.5 Yet, even though the UN Charter and the 
law of many other international organizations explicitly refer to ‘principles of justice’, cosmopolitan 
theories on ‘global justice’ and alternative theoris of justice for an international ‘law of peoples’ 
remain highly disputed.6 European courts and the ICJ refer regularly to requi ments of ‘proper 
administration of justice’ in clarifying procedural principles of due process of law and substantive 
principles of justice. The ICJ, for instance, takes it for granted that: 
                                                   
3 Cf. the explanations of the statues by their sculptor: L Jaggi in Centre William Rappard. Home of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO: Geneva, 2011) 34. Instead of representing ‘justice’ in the traditional way as a 
blind-folded woman holding a scale and a sword, the artist sculptured ‘justitia’ holding a dove (representing 
truth) and checking a serpent (symbolizing lying and deceitfulness) with her feet. Note that the C ntre 
William Rappard had been built for the International Labour Organiztion whose ‘Constitution’ (sic) of 1919 
began with a reference to the need for ‘lasting peace’ that ‘can be established only if it is based upon social 
justice’. 
4 Cf. C.J. Friedrich, The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963), 
chapters II and XX. 
5 J.Neyer, Justice, Not Democracy: Legitimacy in the European Union, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 
48 (2010), 903-921. 
6 See, eg: G.Brock, Global Justice. A Cosmopolitan Account (Oxford: OUP, 2009); R.Martin/ D.A.Reidy (eds), 
Rawls’s Law of Peoples (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006). 
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‘Whatever the legal reasoning of a court of justice, its decisions must by definition be just, and 
therefore in that sense equitable.’7‘Equity as a legal concept is a direct emanation of the idea of 
justice. The Court whose task is by definition to administer justice is bound to apply it.’8 
International customary law (eg, as codified in the Preamble and Article 31 VCLT) requires 
interpreting treaties and settling related disputes ‘in conformity with principles of justice’ and human 
rights. Yet, ‘reasonable disagreement’ among citizens and governments over the interpretation of 
human rights and other ‘principles of justice’ is lke y to remain a permanent reality in view of 
legitimately diverse, individual and democratic prefe nces, legal traditions and ‘constitutional 
pluralism’in the 193 UN member states. In his book n Politics, Aristotle claimed that ‘all men cling 
to justice of some kind’, but they do not agree on what justice is: ‘their conceptions are imperfect and 
they do not express the whole idea’.9 Modern IEL continues to be influenced by six competing 
conceptions of justice: 
Diverse Spheres of Justice in Dispute Settlement and IEL Adjudication? 
Questions of justice arise whenever citizens claim conflicting rights or request the elimination of 
arbitrary distinctions and the fair settlement of their disputes on the basis of ‘just principles’ and ‘fair 
procedures’ reviewing and ‘balancing’ the competing claims and justifying the final judgment. The 
need for peaceful settlement of disputes over conflicti g claims for justice, for judicial protection of
transnational rule of law and judicial remedies based on principles of justice is today more recognized 
in IEL (e.g. in the national and international judicial remedies and compulsory jurisdictions of ‘courts 
of justice’ protected in international trade, investment and regional economic law) than in most other 
areas of international law. Since Aristotle, distribut ve, corrective, commutative justice and equity 
continue to be recognized as important ‘spheres of justice’ in the design of national and international 
dispute settlement systems (eg, for ‘violation complaints’, ‘non-violation complaints’ and ‘situation 
complaints’ pursuant to GATT Article XXIII); post-colonial IEL also includes ‘principles of 
transitional justice’ (eg, in Part IV of GATT and in the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the 
WTO). Yet, the ‘Westphalian’ focus on rights and obligations of states and the lack of adequate rights 
and judicial remedies of individuals in IEL are, arguably, among the main reasons why the prevailing 
‘Westphalian conceptions’ of IEL do not prevent theunnecessary poverty of more than 1 billion poor 
people and the inadequate protection of human rights and transnational rule of law for billions of other 
people. The prevailing ‘Westphalian paradigm’ of most worldwide IEL agreements focusing on 
dispute settlement procedures among states protects n ither human rights and consumer welfare of 
citizens nor individual access to justice inside countries. Arguably, the lack of ‘cosmopolitan justice’ 
hinders producers, investors, traders and consumers to u e and develop IEL for maximizing consumer 
welfare, transnational rule of law and protection of citizen rights more effectively. As long as national 
and international judges do not cooperate in protecting transnational rule of law for the benefit of 
citizens, the pre-democratic ‘intergovernmental governance’ and inadequately regulated ‘private self-
governance’ of the worldwide division of labour remain characterized by numerous ‘market failures’ 
and ‘governance failures’ to the detriment of equal rights of citizens and their consumer welfare. 
 
                                                   
7 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment ICJ Reports 1969, pp. 48-49, para. 88. For other references to the 
relevant ICJ jurisprudence see, e.g., G.Ziccardi Capaldo (ed), Repertory of Decisions of the International 
Court of Justice 1947-1992, Vol II (The Hague: Kluwer, 1995), at pp.777, 781, 825, 855, 93 . 
8 Continental Shelf (Tunisia v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Judgment ICJ Reports 1982, p.60, para. 71. 
9 Cf. Aristotle, The Politics and The Constitution of Athens (ed. by S.Everson, Cambridge: CUP, 1996), at xiv. 
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Justice as Efficiency and Maximization of Utility? 
The Bretton-Woods Agreements, GATT/WTO law and most other areas of IEL outside Europe are 
based on utilitarian principles of economic efficiency aimed at enhancing ‘total national welfare’. For
instance, GATT/WTO law ranks trade policy instruments and subsidies according to their respective 
economic efficiency by allowing use of non-discriminatory product and production regulations, 
production subsidies and ‘unbound’ tariffs, but legally limiting the imposition of tariffs in excess of
market access commitments and prohibiting discriminatory non-tariff trade barriers, discriminatory 
import and export subsidies, or ‘unnecessary’ technical regulations and sanitary standards. Yet, in 
contrast to rights-based European economic law committed to a ‘highly competitive social market 
economy’ within ‘an area of freedom, security and justice’ (Article 3 TEU) among 27 EU member 
states, the prevailing utilitarian conceptions of IEL outside Europe offer neither effective protection of 
‘consumer welfare’ (which is nowhere mentioned in the 30’000 pages of WTO law) nor adequate 
justification of the often one-sided, utilitarian focus on redistributing income in favour of powerful 
producer interests (‘producer welfare’). Utilitarians ignore the impossibility of measuring, comparing 
and maximizing all human preferences, values (eg, competing moral ideals) and other forms of 
happiness (‘utilities’) on a single scale. The welfare of a nation, the quality of the life of citizens and 
their ‘life satisfaction’ (eg, in terms of health, education, democratic self-government) cannot be 
inferred from measuring national income. By treating citizens as mere objects of governmental ‘utility 
maximization’ and neglecting human rights, the utilitarian focus on efficient production and 
distribution offers no guarantee for taking into account the non-economic dimensions of human 
welfare, for instance whenever restrictive business practices or emergency situations price out poor 
people of access to water, essential food and medical services. The utilitarian assumption that morality 
consists in weighing and aggregating costs and benefits and ‘maximizing happiness’ (eg, by 
governmental redistribution of the ‘gains from trade’ at the whim of the rulers) also risks being 
inconsistent with the moral principles underlying modern human rights (like respect for human dignity 
and ‘inalienable’ human rights). Can the utilitarian goal of maximizing welfare (eg, in terms of the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number) be reconciled with other theories of justice claiming, for 
instance, that the distribution of goods should be based on libertarian rights of self-ownership (eg, over 
one’s body, labour and ‘fruits of labour’), on egalitarian equal freedoms and human rights, or on virtue 
and moral desert? Do the IEL practices of focusing o  reciprocal market access commitments (eg, in 
GATT/WTO law) subject to ‘exceptions’ reserving sovereign rights to unilaterally protect non-
economic public interests (eg, in GATT Articles XIX – XXI) adequately reconcile IEL with human 
rights? 
Justice as Libertarian Freedom and Self-Ownership? 
Since ancient Greek, Roman and Italian republicanism up to the human rights revolutions during the 
18th century, the republican ideal of freedom and self-government of citizens for the common good 
(res publica) was linked to the idea of not being subject to anyone’s domination: citizen rights to 
freedom, ownership of the public goods and collectiv  self-determination and control of the 
government (as agent with limited powers delegated by the citizens as the principals) were limited to 
property-owners who were not subject to anyone’s domination and did not depend on the good will of 
another.10 Commercial law, arbitration and the ‘merchant republics’ during the Italian renaissance 
were likewise shaped by libertarian claims that personal self-ownership of one’s body, labour, ‘fruits 
of labour’, property rights, investments, freedom of c ntract and other ‘market freedoms’ must be 
legally respected and protected against government interferences provided the economic development 
and distribution were based on ‘justice in initial holdings’ and ‘justice in transfer’.11 Also mercantilist 
trade policies and the development of IEL were driven by power-oriented colonialism, imperialism 
                                                   
10 Cf. P.Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford : OUP, 1997).  
11 Cf. R.Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford : Blackwell, 1974). 
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and the evolution of some trading countries (like England, Portugal and Spain) into powerful 
hegemons protecting their foreign investments and shipping monopolies abroad, whereas other 
countries were subjected to colonial and imperial exploitation or remained poor without engaging in 
welfare-enhancing division of labour. Modern economic theory and theories of justice (eg, of J. 
Rawls) emphasize that the welfare of people and states depends on reasonable rules, institutions and 
‘human resources’ rather than on natural resources. H nce, the fact that some countries without natural 
resources (like Hong Kong, Singapore, Switzerland) have become rich and industrialized, whereas 
some resource-rich countries remain less-developed (like many LDCs in Africa), can be explained 
most convincingly in terms of their respective legal systems for protecting economic freedoms, 
property rights and other legal preconditions of a welfare-enhancing division of labour. Yet, in the 
21st century, libertarian claims to unrestricted self-ownership (eg, to sell one’s body parts), freedom f 
voluntary exchange (eg, for outsourcing pregnancy for pay) and compensation for ‘regulatory takings’ 
of foreign investor rights, like libertarian opposition to governmental taxation for financing the supply 
of public goods, are increasingly inconsistent with modern human rights and democratic legislation.12 
Libertarianism also offers no coherent theory for multilevel governance and protection of international 
public goods aimed at limiting ‘harmful externalities’ of national policies (eg, in terms of pollution f 
the environment and the ‘tragedy of global commons’) and protecting reasonable, common citizen 
interests in interdependent ‘aggregate public goods’ such as efficient, transnational monetary, trading, 
financial and rule-of-law systems promoting international division of labour and consumer welfare.     
Justice as Priority of Human and Constitutional Rights over the Common Good? 
Utilitarian inference of moral and legal principles from satisfaction of human desires, like libertarian 
derivation of moral and legal claims from ‘freedom as non-domination’, privilege the powerful and 
leave the rights of weaker persons vulnerable. Can ‘market freedoms’ and mutually beneficial, 
voluntary market transactions be justified also on other than libertarian and utilitarian grounds of 
‘instrumental rationality’, for instance as integral p rts of existential and professional self-realization 
of reasonable human persons whose discursive and social nature requires participating in social 
cooperation among free and equal citizens for realizing their reasonable autonomy? Even though 
social discourse and market transactions (including ‘opinion markets’) are part of the empirical, 
sensible world that may be governed by heteronomous ‘laws of nature’ rather than by autonomous 
moral actions, social discourse is reasonable only to the extent that the discourse partners implicitly 
and autonomously recognize each other as free and equal participants in their discursive search for 
truth.13  
Contrary to utilitarian conceptions of individuals a being ‘the slaves of our desires’ and libertarian 
acceptance of many people remaining subject to domination by others, human rights require respecting 
the dignity, the human capacity of reasonable autonomy, the ‘inalienable birth rights’ and freedoms of 
choice of every human being. European economic law protects and enforces the common market 
freedoms among the 30 member states of the European Eco omic Area (EEA) as fundamental, 
                                                   
12 On the need for ‘human rights coherence’ of IEL see: Petersmann (note 1), chapter IV. 
13 On discourse theory, and the implicit, moral respect of discourse partners as having reasonable autonomy and 
dignity, as justification of human rights ‘without metaphysics’ see : R.Alexy, Menschenrechte ohne 
Metaphysik ? in : Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 52 (2004), 15-24. For a comparison of the 
metaphysical, Kantian and Rawlsian moral justifications of principles of justice, human rights and 
hypothetical ‘social contracts’ see, eg : M.J.Sandel, Justice. What’s the Right Thing to Do? (New York: 
Farrar/Strauss/Giraux, 2009), chapters 5 and 6. While Kant justified his cosmopolitan ‘right of hospital y’ on 
moral grounds, it remains contested whether the legal interpretation of EU ‘market freedoms’ as 
‘fundamental rights’ can be justified on moral grounds only (eg, as representing ‘generalizable human 
interests’ of all EU citizens). Similarly, the derivation of individual investor rights and judicial remedies from 
international investment treaties, like the derivation of labour rights from ILO conventions, can be justified 
not only on utilitarian grounds, but also on human rights principles. 
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cosmopolitan rights that must be exercised in conformity with, and remain consistent with all human 
rights. Whereas John Locke invoked god for justifying human rights, UN and European human rights 
law derives human rights from respect for human autonomy and reasonableness as ‘inalienable rights’, 
including a right ‘to a social and international orde  in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration can be fully realized’ (Article 28 Univeral Declaration of Human Rights). Kantian, 
Rawlsian and other modern theories of justice (eg, by R.Dworkin and B.Ackerman)14 explain why 
moral respect for human autonomy and reasonableness requires the priority of equal liberty rights (as 
‘first principle of justice’) over particular conceptions of the ‘good life’ and the ‘common good’. 
According to both Kant and Rawls, a just society protects the equal freedoms of its citizens to pursue 
their own, often diverse conceptions for a good life – provided such conceptions remain compatible 
with equal freedoms for all – without imposing any particular conception of a good life. Arguably, 
regardless of moral and philosophical theories and conceptions of human agents and their ‘individual 
sovereignty’15, the universal recognition of human rights (eg, in UN law) as constitutional foundation 
of all governance powers confirms the legal priority of equal human freedoms (as defined by human 
rights) as integral part of positive, national and i ternational legal systems in the 21st century. Yet, it 
remains contested whether, and to what extent, the moral and legal ‘priority of right over the good’ 
constitutionally limits democratic legislation to protect agreed ‘common goods’. In contrast to Anglo-
Saxon conceptions of civil and political human and constitutional rights as ‘trumping’ in case of 
conflicts with democratic majority legislation, European courts acknowledge that legislative and 
administrative restrictions of human rights may be aimed at protecting other constitutional rights 
requiring ‘balancing’ of competing civil, political, economic or social rights protection in order to 
establish whether governmental restrictions were suitable, necessary and proportionate means for 
reconciling competing human or constitutional rights in reasonable procedures.16 
Justice as Communitarian Democracy? 
As individuals are born into families, grow up in social communities and their individual control over 
the forces governing individual lives is diminishing with ‘globalization’, the liberal conception of 
individuals as ‘freely choosing, unencumbered selves’ is criticized from communitarian perspectives.17 
Also voluntary consent to ‘social contracts’ and agreements – even if reflecting ideals of autonomy 
and reciprocity - does not prove the fairness of contracts, for instance if their conclusion was due to 
unequal bargaining power and information asymmetries. The moral and legal ‘human rights 
imperative’ of treating all persons as ends in thems lves and as autonomous, reasonable ‘principals’ of 
governments with limited, delegated powers justifies conceptions of democratic self-governance and 
communitarian supply of public goods that go far beyond republican conceptions of common 
ownership of public goods (res publica) by property-owning citizens contributing to the republican 
institutions. Constitutional democracies in Europe increasingly limit libertarian claims of ‘self-
ownership’ of one’s body, labour and ‘fruits of labour’, for instance if such claims neglect human 
dignity and other human rights limiting market freedoms (eg, labour rights). Also libertarian 
opposition to redistribution of ‘market outcomes’ based on ‘justice in holdings’ and ‘justice in 
transfers’ (R.Nozick) has not prevented the ‘social m rket economies’ in Europe from adopting ever 
more comprehensive social legislation, taxation andwelfare payments for the poor. The unlimited 
                                                   
14 Cf. R.Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London : Duckworth, 1977) ; B.Ackerman, Social Justice in the 
Liberal State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). 
15 On protection of transnational ‘cosmopolitan liberty’ and ‘individual sovereignty’ in IEL by ‘inalienable’ 
human rights see Petersmann (note 1), chapters III and VIII. 
16 For comparative studies of the different American and European judicial standards of reviewing economic 
legislative and administrative acts see: Petersmann (note 1), chapters III and VIII. 
17 For a criticism of the liberal conception of human persons and of their ‘moral autonomy’ from a 




demand of citizens for scarce goods, services and other resources and the need for governmental 
supply and protection of ‘public goods’ increasingly prompt democracies to liberalize international 
trade and investments and design IEL in conformity with utilitarian and libertarian principles of 
economic efficiency, market competition and protection of property rights. Yet, this instrumental 
‘economic rationality’ of modern IEL does not prevent democracies from limiting the ‘utilitarian 
efficiency’ of regulation whenever utilitarian conceptions of IEL neglect human rights (eg, by treating 
some individuals as means for the happiness of others), ignore general consumer welfare (eg, by one-
sidedly prioritizing ‘producer welfare’), or neglect the legitimacy of economically inefficient, social 
contestation (eg, labour strikes, social protests) and the need for respecting reasonable ‘constitutional 
pluralism’.  
Should IEL be based on ‘Cosmopolitan Justice’? 
Republicanism, constitutionalism and human rights argue in different, yet complementary ways for 
empowering citizens as ‘democratic principals’ to assume democratic control and responsibility of the 
limited powers delegated to governments and of their common property of public goods (res publica). 
Arguably, republican, human and constitutional rights to private and democratic self-governance as 
well as to ‘access to justice’ through judicial review of governmental restrictions of individual 
freedoms are necessary not only for protecting civil, political, economic, social and cultural human 
rights with due respect for their often different protection in different jurisdictions with diverse 
constitutional traditions and democratic preferences. As explained by the Kantian theory of 
cosmopolitan multilevel constitutionalism18, the moral arguments for ‘principles of justice’ protecting 
maximum equal cosmopolitan liberties of citizens apply also to mutually beneficial, transnational 
cooperation among citizens in the global division of labour. Kant’s proposals for multilevel, 
constitutional protection of cosmopolitan freedoms were based on Kant’s categorical imperative of 
maximizing equal freedoms as a universal law by treating persons as legal subjects rather than mere 
objects. Kant argued that the ever more precise, legal clarification of equal freedoms and cosmopolitan 
rights and remedies would not only promote mutually beneficial trade, but contribute also to limiting 
the ‘unsocial sociability’ of rational egoists by institutionalizing ‘public peace’. Similarly, Rawls has 
argued that institutionalizing ‘public reason’ limiting human rivalry and protecting rule of law in 
social cooperation requires a ‘four-stage sequence’ of constitutional, legislative, executive and judicial 
rulemaking and institutions protecting an ‘overlapping consensus’ on ‘principles of justice’ and rule of 
law among citizens and governments with often conflicting value preferences and self-interests.19 
Empirical evidence seems to confirm that rights-based IEL regimes – like the common market law of 
the EU and EEA Agreements, regional free trade areas ( g, chapters XI and XIX of NAFTA) and 
investment treaties protecting individual rights and judicial remedies - have protected not only rights 
of citizens and their consumer welfare through mutually beneficial economic cooperation across 
frontiers; the multilevel judicial protection of transnational rule of law has also transformed the 
European economic integration treaties into the most effective peace treaties in European history. As 
an instrument of promoting economic welfare and human autonomy rights, rights-based IEL has 
proven to be more effective than the prevailing ‘Hobbesian conceptions’ of ‘international law among 
states’ denying citizens individual rights to invoke, eg, GATT and WTO rules in domestic courts in 
order to protect transnational rule of law for the benefit of producers, traders, investors and consumers. 
The free movement of persons and ‘EU citizenship rights’ inside the EU further illustrate that 
protection of cosmopolitan rights can broaden and erich, rather than undermine communitarian 
conceptions of a just and diverse society and of a good life embedded into social solidarity. 
                                                   
18 Cf. Petersmann (note 1), chapter III. 
19 On the ‘four-stage sequence’ of legitimate rulemaking inside constitutional democracies like the US, see 
J.Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: OUP, 1972) 195 ff. 
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Hence, many advocates of human and cosmopolitan rights argue that, in contrast to Rawls’ refusal to 
extend his principles of justice for a constitutional democracy beyond the state to an international Law 
of Peoples20, neither ‘Rawlsian tolerance’ vis-à-vis non-liberal, but ‘decent people’ and states nor the 
individual and democratic responsibilities of citizens for their own, individual and social welfare 
justify neglecting transnational human and cosmopolitan rights and obligations in IEL. As illustrated 
by the unnecessary poverty of so many people in less-d veloped countries (LDCs), the prevailing 
‘Westphalian conceptions’ of ‘international law among sovereign states’ fail to protect citizens against 
widespread abuses of foreign policy powers and under-supply of international public goods. 
Diplomatic insistence on ‘member-driven governance’ (eg, in the Bretton Woods institutions, GATT 
and the WTO) reflects pre-democratic Hobbesian claims that, once the people have conferred powers 
to the rulers, citizens have surrendered their authority rather than remaining ‘democratic principals’ 
and holders of ‘inalienable rights’ to individual and democratic self-government under the rule of law.
The more globalization transforms national constitutions into ‘partial constitutions’ that cannot 
unilaterally protect transnational ‘aggregate public goods’ (like mutually beneficial, international 
monetary, trade, financial, environmental and rule of law systems composed of national public goods) 
in a globally integrated world, the more do citizen welfare and effective protection of economic rights 
within and beyond state borders require ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’ based on human rights, 
democratic self-governance and transnational rule of law rather than only on state consent.21 As 
already universally acknowledged in Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), 
stronger protection of the economic welfare and human rights of billions of citizens in today’s globally 
integrated world economy depends on whether IEL will succeed in regulating the ‘collective action 
problems’ of a mutually beneficial world trading, financial, environment and development system 
more effectively for the benefit of citizens and their cosmopolitan rights. Republicanism, 
constitutionalism and human rights argue for limiting the ubiquity of government failures and market 
failures in international economic relations by stronger legal and judicial protection of cosmopolitan 
rights. 
                                                   
20 Cf J. Rawls, Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
21 Cf. Petersmann (note 1), chapters III and VII, andM.Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On 
the Relationship of Constitutionalism in and beyond the State, in : J.L.Dunoff/J.P.Trachtman (eds), Ruling 




How to Justify IEL in the 21st Century? 
Law and governance need justification: ‘Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of 
systems of thought’.22 In contrast to the search for truth in the natural sciences, law and jurisprudence 
(e.g. in the sense of the right application of the law on the basis of objective criteria) are often lss 
about ‘truth’ (e.g. in case of establishing legal facts) than – notably in case of normative decisions - 
about ‘institutionalizing public reason’ providing for ‘reasonable procedures’ of rule-making, rule-
administration and rule-enforcement based on ‘balanced judgments’ (e.g. resulting from democratic 
discourse among free and equal citizens, representative parliamentary decision-making, judicial 
procedures administered by impartial and independent judges so as to secure ‘rule of law’, ‘balancing’ 
among competing human and constitutional rights based on principles of non-discrimination, necessity 
and proportionality). Arguably, reasonable judgments and justice (e.g. in the sense of reasonable 
justification) are the equivalent in normative social sciences to truth in the natural sciences.23 The 
current ‘Euro-crises’ triggered by private and public debt crises and the increasing ‘spread’ among 
financial interest rates for indebted Eurozone countries illustrate the direct link between legitimacy 
and IEL: The ‘spread’ emerged in financial markets as a rational response to increased risks of private 
and public debt defaults (i.e. breaches of contract l w) in Eurozone member countries persistently 
violating the fiscal and debt disciplines of European Union law (e.g. Article 126 TFEU). In view of the 
‘bail-out prohibitions’ in Articles 123-125 TFEU, democratic legitimacy and rule of law necessitated 
concluding the various bail-out agreements (for Greece, Ireland and Portugal) through 
intergovernmental ad hoc agreements approved by national parliaments within e limits of their 
respective constitutional laws (e.g. as specified by German Constitutional Court judgments 
emphasizing the constitutional limits for Germany’s participation in such bail-out agreements). 
Arguably, the financial, economic and social ‘Eurozone crises’ resulted from deeper ‘rule of law’ 
crises. Yet, what does ‘rule of law’ mean in a system of private and public, national and international 
regulation of interdependent, integrated economies by multilevel governance institutions tolerating 
non-compliance with EU legal disciplines? Is economic regulation by ‘majoritarian democracies’ 
based on ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ and by non-democratic UN member states subject to similar 
legal restraints as in the constitutional democracies of the EU?  
Conceptions of IEL Depend on the Value Premises 
Similar to the story of the blind men touching different parts of an elephant and describing the same 
animal in contradictory ways, private and public, national and international lawyers continue to 
perceive IEL from competing perspectives, for instace as (1) public international law (e.g. the 
Bretton Woods Agreements), (2) ‘global administrative law’ (e.g. the legal practices of UN 
Specialized Agencies and the WTO), (3) ‘conflicts law’ (e.g. international commercial law and 
arbitration), (4) multilevel constitutional regulation (e.g. rights-based European economic law and 
adjudication) or (5) multilevel economic regulation f the economy (e.g. NAFTA law) within the 
limits of national, democratic constitutionalism. The conceptions of IEL differ because economic 
regulation and ‘rule of law’ tend to be justified in diverse ways, for instance on grounds of  
• national or individual utility (e.g. ‘national inter sts’, public goods, welfare); 
• state consent and ‘sovereignty’ (e.g. to adopt natio l legislation violating IEL); 
• democratic or individual consent (e.g. to ‘regulatory takings’ of property rights); 
• ‘public choice’ (e.g. majority and interest group politics);  
                                                   
22 Rawls (note 19), at 3. 
23 Cf. R.Alexy, The Reasonableness of Law, in: G.Bongi vanni/G.Sartor/C.Valantini (eds), Reasonableness and 
Law (Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2009), 5-15. 
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• principles of ‘good governance’, human rights and other constitutional values (like private and 
public autonomy of arbitral tribunals).  
The universal human rights obligations of all UN member states and the customary law requirements 
of interpreting treaties, and settling related disputes, ‘in conformity with the principles of justice’ and 
human rights (as codified in the Preamble and Article 31 of the VCLT) require interpreting and 
justifying IEL treaties in conformity with human rights and other principles of justice, as it is done by 
governments and national and European courts in all30 member states of the EEA24 and increasingly 
also in regional economic and human rights courts in Latin-America25 as well as in investor-state 
arbitration.26 Such ‘constitutional interpretations’ of liberty rights and their ‘balancing’ are likely to 
differ depending on whether individual freedom of action is protected broadly (e.g. as a constitutional 
‘right of subjective freedom’ as justified by Hegel) or merely as a ‘common law freedom’ subject to 
whatever restrictions approved by legislative majorities.27 Yet, given the diversity of moral, political 
and legal conceptions and legal traditions of human rights and ‘principles of justice’ and the ‘post-
modern scepticism’ about the objectivity of moral reasoning, many governments and economic courts 
prefer avoiding controversies about ‘sovereignty’ (e.g. in terms of the legitimate ‘right to rule’), 
democracy (e.g. in terms of ‘constitutional democracy’ vs majoritarian democracy), competing human 
rights conceptions (e.g. moral, political and constitutional interpretations of fundamental rights) and 
‘principles of justice’ whenever legal arguments, judgments and dispute settlement can be justified on 
the basis of textual, contextual and functional interpretations of economic rules. 
Conceptions of IEL also Differ among International Relations Theories 
International relations theories focusing on states (like realism, institutionalism, functionalism) oralso 
on individual, group and government actions (like ‘public choice’ and constitutional theories) try to 
explain the rational choices of political actors rather than ‘legal methodologies’ (e.g. for interpreting 
legal rules). Many ‘realist’ claims (e.g. that political morality does not reach beyond national legal 
systems) are empirically inconsistent with the increasing impact of international law (e.g. human 
rights law), international regulatory agencies (e.g. multilevel monetary and competition authorities in 
the EU), multilevel adjudication or ‘human rights revolutions’ on transnational relations; ‘realist 
neglect’ of international law all too often reflects ignorance or ‘capture’ of regulators by powerful 
lobbies benefitting from interest group politics at the expense of ‘rationally ignorant consumers’. 
Economic analysis of law, by contrast, may be important not only for explaining ‘economic structures’ 
of private and public law28 but also for interpreting legal rules based on principles of economics.29 
Also political theories of justice and other legal philosophies may be of direct, normative relevance for 
                                                   
24  For examples see: U.Khaliq, Ethical Dimensions of the Foreign Policy of the EU. A Legal Appraisal 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2008).  
25 See, e.g., the MERCOSUR arbitral award of 6 September 2006 in the ‘Bridges case’ between Argentina and 
Uruguay (cf. L.Lixinski, Human Rights in MERCOSUR, in : M.T.F.Filho/ L.Lixinski/ M.B.O.Giupponi 
(eds), The Law of MERCOSUR (Oxford : Hart Publishing, 2010), at 351 ff.  
26 See, e.g., the UNCITRAL Arbitral Decision on Liability of 30 July 2010 in AWG v Argentina (i.e. one of the 
more than 40 arbitration proceedings against Argentina’s restrictions in response to its financial crisis in 
2001), at para. 262: ‘In the circumstances of these cases, Argentina’s human rights obligations and its 
investment treaty obligations are not inconsistent, contradictory, or mutually exclusive’. The investment 
arbitral awards cited in this contribution are electronically available (eg, at: ita.law.uvic.ca/). 
27 On the centrality of jurisprudence for interpreting equal liberty rights of citizens as individual or merely 
objective freedoms ee: Petersmann (note 1), chapter III, and W.McCormack, Lochner, Liberty, Property and 
Human Rights, in: NYU Journal of Law & Liberty 1 (2005), 432 ff. 
28 Cf. J.Trachtman, The Economic Structure of International Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
29 Cf. Symposium: Public International Law and Economics, in: University of Illinois Law Review Vol. 2008, 1-
435; B. von Klink/S.Taekema (eds), Law and Method of Interdisciplinary Research into Law (Tübingen: 
Mohr & Siebeck, 2011). 
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the interpretation of rules and the legal design of institutions, for instance by justifying inherent 
powers of 'courts of justice', calling for respect for ‘reasonable disagreement’ among citizens and 
polities, and explaining the ubiquity of conflicts of interests not only in terms of rational self-interests 
of the homo economicus but also in view of conflicts inside human minds (e.g. between sentiments, 
‘animal spirits’, rationality and limited reasonableness). Yet, as illustrated by the failures of economics 
to predict the global financial crises since 2008, the numerous ‘market failures’ (like information 
asymmetries, lack of transparency, non-accountabiliy of abuses of power) prompt ever more 
economists to call for ‘a new economic paradigm’ (J.Stiglitz).30 From the point of view of theories of 
justice, equal freedoms (as ‘first principle of justice’) and the human capacity of reasonable autonomy 
(as recognized in numerous human rights instruments like Article 1 of the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights) require justification of all governmental restrictions of equal freedoms through legal 
‘institutionalization of public reason’ based not only on fair procedures (e.g. deliberative and 
parliamentary democracy, impartial adjudication, ‘balancing’ of competing civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural human rights). IEL is also ever-more influenced by substantive ‘principles of 
justice’ (eg, in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights), institutional ‘checks and balances’ (like 'courts 
of justice') and other legal safeguards protecting 'sovereign equality of states', ‘reasonable 
disagreement’ and the reality of ‘constitutional pluralism’ among constitutional democracies, 
majoritarian or non-liberal democracies.  
                                                   
30 See, e.g., N.Serra/J.E.Stiglitz (eds), The Washington Consensus Reconsidered. Towards a New Global 
Governance (Oxford : OUP, 2008). 
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Legal Positivism, Natural Law, Social and Policy Conceptions of IEL and 
‘Transnational Law’ 
In view of the limited mandates of international courts deciding disputes on the basis of the applicable 
rules of law and the customary methods of textual, contextual and functional treaty interpretation (cf.
Articles 31-33 VCLT), legal positivism has become th  generally accepted starting point in research 
about IEL. Hence, legal systems are perceived as a union of 'primary rules of conduct' and 'secondary 
rules' of recognition, change and adjudication31 that dynamically interact with changing legal practices 
by private and public legal actors, who often justify legal claims and interpretations of rules by 
invoking legal principles.32 Hart claimed that international law 'resembles, (…) in form though not at 
all in content, a simple regime of primary or customary law' and, due to its incomplete 'secondary 
rules', a 'primitive legal order'.33 Yet, in contrast to other areas of international law where third-party 
adjudication remains an exception to the rule of 'auto-interpretation', many areas of IEL are today 
characterized by an ever stronger role of national a d international courts in clarifying, progressively 
developing and enforcing transnational rule of law, thereby transforming IEL into a more developed 
legal system than other areas of the Westphalian ‘international law among sovereign states’. The state-
sovereigntist distinction between ‘international public law among states’ (considering states as 
exclusive subjects and objects of international law) nd ‘international private law’ (based on national 
choice-of-law rules) is increasingly blurred by the emergence of ‘transnational legal systems’ 
recognizing individuals as legal subjects deriving i dividual rights from international agreements (eg, 
on human rights, investment and intellectual property law, regional free trade, economic integration 
and environmental agreements) and creating autonomous, de-nationalised legal systems (like lex 
mercatoria, lex sportiva, lex digitalis of the Internet).34 The new ‘legal pluralism’ based on functional 
rather than territorial legal sub-systems (eg, WTO membership admitting not o ly states but also sub- 
and supranational customs territories like Hong Kong and the EU) often entails conflicts of 
jurisdiction challenging the boundaries and cultures of national, transnational and international legal 
and judicial systems and related legal pre-conceptions (Vorverständnis) of legal actors.35 The 
diplomatic focus on 'member-driven governance' (e.g. in WTO law) illustrates that ‘legal pluralism’, 
European perceptions of independent and impartial judges as the primary paradigm of justice and 
authoritative interpretation of law, and individual rights and judicial remedies of ‘market citizens’ and 
other non-governmental economic actors enforcing IEL as ‘private attorneys general’ remain 
contested by 'realist claims' of intergovernmental power politics. European legal research is 
characterized by continuous attempts at integrating positive law, empirical, normative and moral 
dimensions of legal integration. Yet, also in European integration law, it remains controversial, for 
                                                   
31 Cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: OUP, 1994), chapter V. 
32  This constant interaction between ‘law as a legal order’ and ‘law as legal practices’ is emphasized by ‘critical 
legal positivism’, according to which law and its legal changes should be examined on (1) the surface level of 
positive law, (2) the legal culture, and (3) the deep structures of law; cf. K.Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism 
(Aldershot, 2002). In his contribution on ‘A New Legal Realism : Method in International Economic Law 
Scholarship’ to the book edited by C.B.Picker/I.D.Bunn/D.W. Arner (eds), International Economic Law. The 
State and Future of the Discipline (Oxford : Hart Publishing, 2008), G.Shaffer distinguishes four varieties of 
IEL scholarship: formalist/doctrinal, normative/activist, theoretical/analytical, and empirical.    
33 Hart (note 31), at 214. 
34 On the different forms of ‘rights cosmopolitanism’ not only in EU and EEA law, but also in the European 
Convention of Human Rights since the entry into force of its Protocol No.11 and the judicial recognition of 
its supra-legislative status in national legal systems throughout Europe see: H.Keller/A.Stone Sweet (ds), A 
Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Orders (Oxford: OUP, 2008). 
35 For case-studies of competing jurisdictions of national, European, international and arbitral courts see, eg: 
N.Lavranos, Jurisdictional Competition. Selected Cases in Interational and European Law (Groningen: 
Europa Law Publishing, 2009). 
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example, to what extent individual access to justice should be protected (eg, in the foreign policy 
area), and whether ‘European law’ should be conceived as one single legal system (e.g. a ‘Union 
based on the rule of law’ including EU law and the national legal systems of the 27 EU member states) 
or as a ‘multilevel, composite system’ composed of diverse, national and international legal orders, 
which often serve as ‘laboratories’ for progressively improving European economic law. 
The 'Dual Nature' of Modern Legal Systems 
Legal positivism and textual interpretations of rules often leave open normative questions. Due to the 
worldwide recognition – in more than hundred UN human rights instruments - of ‘inalienable’ human 
rights ‘deriving from respect for human dignity’ and obligating all UN member states to respect, 
protect and promote human rights, natural law theory has become an integral part of positive 
international law; it may be relevant for interpreting, e.g., the systemic nature of human rights (e.g. as 
legal rights derived from moral principles and political procedures)36, the relationships between ‘rules’ 
and ‘principles’ in human rights law and IEL, the legal clarification of ‘common, but differentiated 
responsibilities’ in international environmental law, and the need for respecting the diverse 
preferences of human beings and their diverse, democratic governance systems. The human rights 
jurisprudence of European courts confirms that the recognition of jus cogens and of other legal 
hierarchies (e.g. of constitutional over legislative and administrative rules) may justify judicial 
findings that unjust rules (e.g. ‘smart economic sanctions’ by the UN Security Council disregarding 
human rights) may not be a valid part of positive European law. The legal ‘validity’ of legal rules has 
to be identified, inter alia, by the criteria provided in the ‘rules of recognition’ and their interpretation 
by citizens, governments and courts. In constitutional democracies, the multilevel human rights 
obligations of states constitutionally limit the ‘rules of recognition’ by permitting recognition of only 
such rules and institutions as legitimate and legaly valid that respect constitutional rights and 
‘principles of justice’ as defined in democratic law-making and judicial proceedings.37 Diplomats 
interested in maintaining their foreign policy discretion often dislike this dual nature of modern legal 
systems – i.e. as positive law (e.g. represented by authoritative issuance and social efficacy of rules) as 
well as ‘inalienable’ human rights and open-ended ‘principles of justice’, which can be of crucial 
importance for legal interpretation and dispute settlement.38 
Many past doctrinal disputes among ‘legal positiviss’ and ‘natural rights theorists’ – for instance, 
whether positive law includes only ‘rules’ or also ‘principles’ of law, and whether judges enjoy 
discretion in the absence of applicable rules – have become out-dated: ‘general principles of law’ are 
today universally recognized sources of internationl law (cf. Article 38 ICJ Statute); almost all 
international courts acknowledge today that, in disputes over the contested meaning of imprecise rules, 
judges must find the ‘right answer’ through ‘administration of justice’, the customary methods of lega 
interpretation and ‘balancing’ of rules in the light of applicable procedures and principles of law.39 
                                                   
36 On the diverse conceptions of ‘economic justice’ and ‘ecological justice’ see, e.g., G. Chartier, Economic 
Justice and Natural Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009) (examining legal questions of ownership, production, 
distribution and consumption on the basis of a natural law theory of ethics). 
37 In order to avoid legal uncertainty, only violations of human rights, constitutional rights and other forms of 
‘extreme injustice’ are likely to affect the validity of legal rules; cf. R. Alexy, The Argument from Injustice 
(Oxford: OUP, 2010). 
38 Cf. R.Alexy, The Dual Nature of Law, in: Ratio Juris 23 (2010), 167-182, who concludes that ‘legal 
positivism is an inadequate theory of the nature of law’ (at 180). But the inclusion of human rights and 
principles of justice into modern international and constitutional law permits accommodating the dual nature 
of law within a broad concept of positive law.  
39 On the increasing resort – in international human rights law, labour law, trade and investment law and 
adjudication - to ‘principle-oriented’ interpretations and adjudication see: E.U. Petersmann, Judging Jud es: 
From ‘Principal-Agent Theory’ to ‘Constitutional Justice’ in Multilevel Judicial Governance of Economic 
Cooperation among Citizens, in: JIEL 11 (2008) 827-884. 
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WTO dispute settlement bodies, investor-state arbitr tion and other economic courts often have good 
reasons to pragmatically avoid controversial question  about justice in IEL, for instance in the WTO 
dispute over differential, yet ‘non-discriminatory’ treatment of less-developed countries benefitting 
from the Generalized System of Trade Preferences, or in WTO dispute settlement rulings on the 
requirement of ‘fair price comparisons’ in anti-dumping investigations.40 The options of ‘exit, voice 
and loyalty’ may be used not only for explaining the dynamic evolution of regional economic law41; 
they also influence the decreasing loyalty to the post-war IEL system (as illustrated by the termination 
of GATT 1947 in 1995, recourse to regional trade agreements as alternatives to concluding the WTO 
Doha Round negotiations) and the often antagonistic recourse to ‘legal pluralism’ in IEL (as illustrated 
by ever more bilateral agreements on investments, movements of natural pesons, energy supply, 
double taxation, intellectual property rights) as well as to unilateralism (e.g. the EU’s extension of its 
carbon emission trading system to flights from and to third countries). Designing and evaluating 
decentralized legal reforms – especially if they are imed at ‘moving from the world of Hobbes to the 
world of Kant’42 - may require interdisciplinary analysis of law justifying legal interpretations in terms 
of ‘responsible sovereignty’ and ‘duties to protect’ in ernationally agreed ‘common interests’ across 
frontiers for the benefit of citizens and their human rights (e.g. by the NATO interventions in Kosovo 
and Libya). 
Competing Normative Policy Conceptions of IEL 
Legal analyses of IEL tend to share the positivist legal premises that positive law must be 
distinguished from normative proposals for changing the existing rules; positive law must therefore 
also remain separable from moral principles that have not been incorporated into positive law; and the 
efficacy of legal systems requires that ‘primary rules’ of conduct and ‘secondary rules’ of recognitio, 
change and adjudication must be established as ‘social fa ts’ reflected in social practices and sources 
of law. Yet, as illustrated by European economic law, transforming ‘anarchy’ into ‘constitutional 
order’ in international economic relations may require going beyond legal analyses of positive IEL by 
challenging authoritarian ormative legal doctrines (e.g. concerning state sovereignty) through re-
interpreting international rules in conformity with e human rights obligations of states and their 
underlying ‘constitutional principles’ (e.g. popular sovereignty entailing ‘duties to protect’ and 
‘responsible sovereignty’). As Albert Einstein famously remarked: ‘We can’t solve problems by using 
the same kind of thinking we used when we created th m.’ The 'New Haven School’s conception of 
international law as a ‘constitutive process of authori ative decision-making’ by individuals and 
democratic constituencies43 explains why jurisprudence is also about making and developing 
                                                   
40 For a discussion see, eg: I.Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (Oxford: OUP, 
2009), at 248 f, 261 f, 314 f.  
41 Cf. J.Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, in: Yale Law Journal 100 (1990), 2403 ff, explaining 
constitutional and economic law reforms in the EU by their dependence on a political equilibrium between 
‘voice, exit and loyalty’ (cf. A.Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty – Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations and States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970). On older, ordo-liberal conceptions 
of ‘interdependence of legal, economic and political orders’, on the risk of ‘social dis-embedding’ by 
globalization, and the need for ‘democratic re-embedding of IEL’ through stronger protection of human 
rights and ‘struggles for individual rights’, see Ptersmann (note 1), Chapters IV and VII. 
42 Cf. P.Lamy, who – in his speech of 6 October 2011 on What Multilateral Trading System for the Future? 
(accessible on the WTO website) – stated : ‘we need to o for international monetary relations what we
already did for trade : move from the world of Hobbes towards the world of Kant’.  
43 On the interdisciplinary 'New Haven methodology’ of analyzing national and international law as decision-
making processes that are both ‘authoritative and controlling’ in the pursuit of a ‘public order of human 
dignity’ enabling individuals to realize their human spirations in their ‘civic order’, proceeding from the 
equal worth of all individuals and the right to indivi ual self-development as constitutional core values, see: 
M.S. McDougal, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, in: M.S. McDougal/W.M. 
Reisman, International Law in Contemporary Perspective: The Public Order of the World Community. Cases 
Methodological Pluralism 
15 
international law through reasonable policy choices protecting human rights, democratic self-
governance and a just social order. The less the ‘IEL in the books’ succeeds in realizing its 
development objectives, the stronger becomes the need for reviewing the ‘IEL in action’ from the 
diverse legal and policy perspectives of the various actors like individuals, firms, parliaments, 
intergovernmental law-makers, national and internatio l administrators, diplomats and judges. 
Normative legal and constitutional theory concentrates on the reasonable relationships between legal 
principles, rules and institutions and on their diverse perceptions depending on the ‘observational 
standpoint’ (e.g. of diplomats, parliaments, international judges, impartial and reasonable citizens, 
non-governmental civil society organizations). The needed policy-oriented legal analysis must also 
take into account the social, economic and politica conditions necessary for realizing legal and 
constitutional policy objectives. As customary inter ational law requires settling international disputes 
in conformity with principles of justice and the human rights obligations of states, textual, systemic 
and functional interpretation of rules – with due regard to relevant legal principles and human rights 
obligations of states - should be as transparent as pos ible in order to be persuasive and promote 
inclusive ‘public reason’ and critical review. Yet, this function of courts as ‘exemplars of public 
reason’ (J.Rawls) may conflict with their specific dispute settlement function in jurisdictions (like 
GATT 1947 and the WTO) depending on voluntary acceptance and implementation of dispute 
settlement findings by governments with political se f-interests in confidential dispute settlements. 
Different legal actors (eg, lawmakers, judges, commercial arbitrators, policy-makers) are likely to 
perceive, use and evaluate legal rules, democratic and dispute settlement procedures, and legal 
methodologies from different perspectives.  
Social Foundations, Interdisciplinary and ‘Contextual’ Dimensions of IEL 
The legitimacy and effectiveness of law as an instrument of social governance depend on the social 
acceptance, democratic support and legal practices not only by government agents but also by citizens 
(as ‘democratic principals’). Hence, law has to be analysed with due regard to its social context and 
legal practices. The context of IEL – for instance, r garding multilevel judicial protection of 
cosmopolitan rights (like trading and investor rights, intellectual property and labour rights, access to 
justice) - differs from the context and functions of other fields like human rights and international 
criminal law. For instance:  
• in order to protect freedom of contract and reduce transaction costs for the billions of producers, 
investors, traders and consumers participating in the worldwide division of labour, IEL relies 
more on decentralized, market-driven information-, coordination-, steering- and sanctioning-
mechanisms as well as on cosmopolitan rights (e.g. in commercial, trade, investment, intellectual 
property, labour, economic integration law and arbitration) than most other fields of international 
cooperation and regulation;  
• the current European private and sovereign debt crises llustrate the strong interdependencies 
between national, regional and worldwide market regulations; inadequate regulation of profit-
driven ‘market forces’ (e.g. in globally integrated financial markets) can entail systemic 
violations of rule of law by private and public actors (e.g. defaulting on their contractual debt 
obligations);   
• the large number of private and public, (sub)national and international actors participating in the 
legal regulation (e.g. of more than half of world trade taking place inside and among some 
(Contd.)                                                             
and Materials (Mineola: Foundation Press, 1981), at 191 ff; W.M. Reisman/S. Wiessner/A.R. Willard, The 
New Haven School: A Brief Introduction, in: The Yale Journal of International Law 32 (2007), 587-594. The 
policy-oriented ‘democratic participant perspective’ of the New Haven School is justified in international law 
by the worldwide recognition of human rights by allUN member states. ‘Realist’ claims of ‘impartial 
description’ of the continuing reality of power-oriented state practices refute neither the normative limitations 
of state sovereignty by modern human rights law nor the increasing recognition of individual rights and 
judicial remedies of individuals in ever more fields of positive international law.   
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80’000 transnational corporations with 10 times as many subsidiaries) illustrates the need for 
transnational rule of law protecting not only rights of governments, but also the rights of citizens 
and other economic actors;  
• IEL provides for more ‘international rule-of-law institutions’ (such as multilevel regulatory and 
judicial authorities, quasi-judicial dispute settlem nt procedures, supervision by international 
organizations) for international rule-making and dispute settlement than other fields of 
international law; yet, the prevailing ‘Westphalian conceptions’ of ‘international law among 
sovereign states’ offer citizens no effective legal and judicial remedies against welfare-reducing 
violations of UN and WTO law; 
• compulsory jurisdiction and jurisprudence of international dispute settlement bodies in IEL (e.g. 
in the WTO, regional trade courts, treaty-based or commercial investor-state arbitration) tend to 
be more frequently invoked and legally more developd (e.g. in terms of ‘balancing’ of public 
and private rights and interests) than in most other ar as of international relations; 
• in view of the ubiquity of ‘market failures’ and ‘governance failures’, economic courts 
throughout Europe insist on the customary law requir ment of interpreting treaties, and settling 
disputes, ‘in conformity with principles of justice’ and human rights, as reflected in the 
increasing references by economic courts throughout Europe to the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights; 
• hence, the more citizens invoke rights beyond their national citizenship for participating in the 
global division of labour, redressing social in justice and acting as ‘global citizens’ in support of 
supply and consumption of global public goods, the more citizens have reasons to claim 
cosmopolitan rights and democratic ownership of transn tional public goods and to challenge 
pre-democratic ‘Westphalian conceptions’ of IEL disregarding the customary law requirement of 
interpreting international law in conformity with human rights and ‘principles of justice’.  
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Constitutional and ‘Public Goods’ Theories of IEL 
J.Rawls’ Theory of Justice explains why ‘the fact that in a democratic regime political power is 
regarded as the power of free and equal citizens as a collective body’ requires that the democratic 
exercise of coercive power over one another can be recognized as being democratically legitimate only 
when ‘political power […] is exercised in accordance with a constitution (written or unwritten) the 
essentials of which all citizens, as reasonable and r tional, can endorse in the light of their common 
human reason’.44 In contrast to majoritarian democracies focusing on ‘freedom of parliament’ rather 
than on constitutional rights of citizens, constitutional democracies share the common experience (e.g. 
in the USA) that protecting constitutional rights vi -à-vis abuses of public and private power requires a 
‘four-stage-sequence’ of constitutional, legislative, administrative and judicial protection of 
fundamental rights and other ‘principles of justice’ (like judicial review). From the point of view of 
citizens and their cosmopolitan rights, ‘constitutional safeguards’ are no less necessary vis-à-vis the 
ever more governance powers transferred to international organizations for the collective supply of 
international public goods. International agreements constituting, limiting, regulating and justifying 
international institutions for mutually beneficial governance of interrelated, national and internatiol 
public goods (like efficient monetary, trading, financial and related rule-of-law systems) can serve 
‘constitutional functions’ for protecting producers, investors, traders, consumers and other citizens 
engaged in mutually beneficial cooperation across frontiers against welfare-reducing border 
discrimination and other harmful abuses of discretionary foreign policy powers.45 But the increasing 
transformation of national into international public goods with ‘horizontal’ as well as ‘vertical 
interdependencies’ (e.g. among national and internaio l markets for goods, services, persons and 
capital movements) also entails new private and public powers (e.g. of private actors in global 
financial markets, international organizations) that risk being abused in the absence of adequate 
constitutional and democratic restraints, as illustrated by the under-regulation of international financi l 
markets ushering in the private and public debt crises since 2008. This increasing gap between the 
‘law in the books’ and the ‘law in action’ rightly prompts ‘new legal realist scholars’ to call for 
multidisciplinary analyses of the ‘new legal world’ and legal problems caused by globalization and by 
its increasing connection of national and international legal regimes.46 
Lessons from 'Judicial Constitutionalization' of IEL in Europe? 
Arguably, the less national parliaments, courts andcitizens control intergovernmental rulemaking in 
distant international organizations and the more rent-s eking interest groups ‘capture’ transnational 
economic regulation (e.g. the EU’s banana and the US cotton policies), the more must the deficit in 
parliamentary and deliberative democracy be compensat d by rights-based constitutionalism and 
multilevel judicial protection of constitutional rights and ‘participatory democracy’ across frontiers. 
As explained by Rawls, ‘in a constitutional regime with judicial review, public reason is the reason of 
                                                   
44 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement  (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2001) 41. 
45 E.U. Petersmann, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of International Economic Law 
(Fribourg: Fribourg University Press and Boulder Press, 1991). On multilevel governance and multilevel 
constitutionalism for the collective supply of international public goods see: Petersmann (note 1). 
46 Cf. S.Macaulay, The New versus the Old Legal Realism: Things Ain’t What They Used to Be, in: Wisconsin 
Law Review 2005, 365-403; V.Nourse/G.Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Reaslism: Can a New World Order 
Prompt a New Legal Theory? in: Cornell Law Review 95 (2009), 61-138. On the need for ‘sociological 
jurisprudence’ see already R.Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, in: American Law Review 44 (1910), 
12, at 15. 
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its supreme court’47; transparent, rules-based and impartial judicial re soning, subject to procedural 
guarantees of due process of law, makes independent courts less politicized ‘fora of principle’ than 
political institutions dominated by interest-group politics; principle-oriented judicial reasoning is also 
of constitutional importance for an ‘overlapping, constitutional consensus’ necessary for legally stable 
and just relations among free, equal and rational citizens who tend to remain deeply divided by 
conflicting moral, religious and philosophical doctrines.  In Europe, the EU Courts, the European 
Court of Human Rights, the EFTA Court and national courts have interpreted the international EC, 
EU, EEA treaties and the ECHR as constitutional orders founded on respect for human rights. 
Multilevel judicial protection of cosmopolitan rights (such as human rights, trading rights, investor 
rights, intellectual property rights) could promote incremental ‘judicial constitutionalization’ also of
other international trade, investment and environmental treaty regimes for the benefit of citizens. Yet, 
in view of the ‘constitutional prioritization’ of civil and political rights over economic and social rights 
of citizens in many countries outside Europe, multilevel judicial protection of economic and social 
rights remains contested. As explained by I. Kant’s theory of multilevel constitutional guarantees of 
equal freedoms (as ‘first principle of justice’) in all human interactions at national, transnational and
international levels, multilevel constitutionalism is neither based on naïve assumptions about 
individuals’ moral capacities nor on utopian calls for a ‘global Constitution’; it is necessary for 
protecting ‘public reason’ against abuses of power in t ansnational relations with due respect for the 
legitimate reality of ‘constitutional pluralism’ so that - even in a ‘society of devils’ (I.Kant) - human 
interactions remain constitutionally restrained.48 The diverse forms of multilevel constitutionalism in 
the EU, the EEA and the ECHR, like the multilevel judicial protection of cosmopolitan rights in 
international commercial, trade, investment, regional i tegration and human rights law outside Europe, 
illustrate that ‘multilevel constitutionalism’ has become a politically feasible and realistic conception 
of ‘constitutional justice’ protecting individual freedom to decide how civil, political, economic, social 
and cultural dimensions of personal autonomy should be ‘prioritized’. Arguably, the legitimacy of 
‘cosmopolitan IEL’ and of ‘multilevel constitutional restraints’ of ‘intergovernmentalism’ and 
international organizations derives from protecting human rights, other ‘principles of justice’ and 
national democracies’ promise of self-governance of citizens limited by rule of law. 
'Public Goods Theories' can help clarifying the Regulatory Tasks of IEL 
In contrast to private goods produced privately in response to private demand a supply, public 
goods are confronted with ‘market failures’ and ‘regulatory failures’ requiring government 
intervention or governmental supply of public goods. Public goods theories analyse the diverse 
‘production strategies’ and optimal legal instruments for limiting the respective ‘collective action 
problems’ impeding supply of public goods, such as tr nsformation of public goods into ‘club goods’ 
or protection of ‘common pool resources’ by allocation of property rights. Economists distinguish 
‘pure global public goods’ that are non-excludable and non-rival (like moonlight) from impure public 
goods that are non-excludable but rival (like the atmosphere and other ‘natural commons’) or non-rival 
but excludable (like patented and published inventions). Private goods tend to be made excludable and 
rival by means of private property rights. While some global public goods are well-provided (like 
communication and transport networks), others are overused (like straddling fish stocks, the ozone 
layer) or under-provided (like public health care, environmental stability). Access to some global 
public goods remains restricted (e.g. industrial use of patented knowledge requires payment of 
royalties). Certain non-rival, human-made ‘collective goods’ are made non-exclusive on a global scale 
                                                   
47 Cf. J.Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), at 231 ff. R.Hirschl, Towards 
Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2004) argues, by contrast, that there is little evidence why people should put more trust in highest 
courts as guardians of the Constitution than in legis ators.  
48 On Kantian ‘multilevel constitutionalism’ and its justification of multilevel constitutional safeguards of equal 
liberty rights see: Petersmann (note 1), chapter III. 
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(e.g. respect for international law). Certain naturl public goods are deliberately left in the global 
public domain (e.g. global gene pools to promote biodiversity preservation). The main conclusion of 
public goods theories is that the legal regulation of the diverse kinds of ‘public goods’ must take into 
account their differences (e.g. among excludable ‘club goods’ and non-excludable public goods) in 
order to determine the most efficient and legitimate ‘production technologies’. For example: 
• ‘single best effort public goods’ (like scientific inventions) may be supplied unilaterally, for 
instance by ‘private-public partnerships’ promoted by public financing of private research for 
public use; 
• collective supply of ‘weakest-link public goods’  (like nuclear non-proliferation, global 
prevention of polio and pirates) may have to focus on financial, technical and other support for a 
limited number of ‘weak states’; 
• global ‘aggregate public goods’ (like efficient monetary, trading, environmental nd security 
systems) are composed of interdependent local, national and regional public goods and must be 
supplied by a ‘summation process’ requiring coordination of multilevel legal and governance 
systems so as to address the ‘vertical’ as well as ‘horizontal interdependencies’ (e.g. between 
monetary and trade rules and policies).49 
As discussed in the Mini-Symposium on Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods in 
issue 3 of JIEL 2012, economic and political public goods theories have so far neglected the legal 
dimensions and much older legal theories of public goods. Yet, in contrast to economic public goods 
theories, political and legal public goods theories all too often remain based on methodological legal 
nationalism with inadequate regard to international law and institutions and to the historical 
experience that, at both national and international levels of governance, the collective action problems 
impeding democratic supply of ‘aggregate public goods’ (like open markets with non-discriminatory 
conditions of competition) have been overcome only by resorting to methodological legal 
constitutionalism. As the private and public debt crises in the Eurozone since 2009 were caused by 
lack of supervision and enforcement of internationally greed fiscal and debt disciplines (notably in 
Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain) and ‘externalized’ some of the harmful effects on other Eurozone 
countries (eg, in terms of debt defaults, bail-out agreements, monetary speculation), the EU ‘six-pack’ 
regulations adopted in November 2011 and the new Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
in the Economic and Monetary Union signed by 25 EU member states in March 2012 provide for 
stronger, multilevel parliamentary, executive and ju icial governance in the European Monetary 
Union, ‘which should be built on stronger national ownership of commonly agreed rules and policies 
and on a more robust framework at the level of the Union for the surveillance of national economic 
policies’.50 Arguably, multilevel cosmopolitan constitutionalism offers more appropriate 
constitutional, legal and democratic foundations for the collective supply of certain transnational 
‘aggregate public goods’ based on economic liberalism and cosmopolitan rights (like a citizen-driven 
trading system) than state-centred ‘legal nationalism’ cultivating welfare-reducing border 
discrimination.  
                                                   
49 For a discussion of the different kinds of public goods and related ‘production strategies’ see: S.Barret, Why 
Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Gobal Public Goods (Oxford: OUP, 2007). 
50 The quoted text is from the preambles of the five EU regulations and one EU directive on the strengthening of 
both the preventive and corrective fiscal and debt disciplines in EU law, which entered into force in 
December 2011 (OJ 2011 L 306). As money is a ‘common resource good’ owned by citizens whose supply 
must remain limited and function as a ‘hard budget res raint’, the Eurozone remains characterized by ‘moral 
hazards’ and incentives for some of its 17 member state  to ‘free-ride’ on their partners. Even though these 
externalities make stronger common economic and monetary policies desirable, the fiscal, debt, economic 
and labour market policies remain primarily national responsibilities inside the EU in conformity with e 
‘subsidiarity principle’ (Article 5 TEU). It remains contested to what extent theories of national fiscal 
federalism can be transferred to the supranational Eurozone governance in view of the small EU budget 
(corresponding to only 1% of the overall national budgets) and the primarily national fiscal, budget, 
economic policy and labour market competences and responsibilities. 
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Need for Comparative Institutional Research 
Almost all UN member states have adopted national Constitutions as well as functionally limited 
international ‘treaty constitutions’ (eg, establishing the ILO, UNESCO, WHO and FAO whose 
constitutive agreements are explicitly called ‘constitutions’) that  
• constitute polities, citizen rights and limited government powers (the ‘enabling function’ of 
constitutions); 
• subject governments to constitutional restraints, institutional ‘checks and balances’ and 
international legal obligations (the ‘limiting function’ of constitutions);  
• commit government policies to constitutionally defin d objectives (like protection of human 
rights) and regulatory instruments (the ‘regulatory function’ of constitutions); and 
• legitimize law and governance by ‘principles of justice’ (the ‘justificatory function’ of 
constitutions). 
The more national Constitutions become ‘partial constitutions’ due to their increasing dependence on 
international law for protecting interdependent (iner)national public goods for the benefit of citizens, 
the more important become the functional interdependencies between ‘big C constitutionalism’ 
constituting national polities and ‘small c constitutionalism’ for protecting functionally limited, 
international public goods. As human rights and natio l Constitutions say little about economic 
regulation and the relative efficiency of alternative policy instrument, there is need for learning 
through comparative institutional research identifying not only legal similarities and differences, but 
explaining also the legal reasons and relative effici ncies of alternative constitutional principles, rules 
and institutions. All democratic constitutions, including functionally limited ‘treaty constitutions’ (e.g. 
establishing rule-making, executive and judicial powers and citizen rights in the EU, EEA and ECHR), 
acknowledge the need for six basic types of rulemaking (ie, constitutional, legislative, administrative, 
judicial, international and private) and of corresponding institutions necessary for democratic self-
governance and ‘deliberative democracy’ based on public discussion. One defining element of 
constitutional democracies is that all six types of rule-making and related institutions interact as 
multilevel systems and compete in their search for pr tecting human rights and other ‘principles of 
justice’. The institutionalization and evolution of the ‘public reason’ necessary for maintaining 
democratic self-governance legitimately differ among countries depending on their historical 
experiences and democratic preferences, for instance regarding the controversial relationships between 
majoritarian political institutions, non-majoritarin regulatory agencies and courts of justice. From a 
constitutional perspective, both political and judicial institutions are ‘agents’ with limited 
constitutional mandates. Arguably, the constitutional and democratic legitimacy of independent 
‘courts of justice’ protecting constitutionally agreed rights of citizens is not inherently weaker than the 
legitimacy of majoritarian, political processes that tend to be less independent and less constrained by 
‘principles of justice’. As emphasized by comparative constitutional and institutional analyses, the 
comparative advantages of constitutional, legislative, administrative, judicial and intergovernmental 
processes depend on which institution is in a better position to protect the constitutional values 
inherent in the relevant rules and arbitrate competing legal claims.51 
                                                   
51 Cf. the interdisciplinary constitutional, legal, economic and ‘public choice’ analyses of multilevel economic 
regulation in: M.Hilf/E.U.Petersmann (eds), National Constitutions and International Economic Law 
(Deventer: Kluwer, 1993). On participation-oriented 'comparative institutional analysis' of alternative 
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Comparative Economic and 'Public Choice' Analyses of IEL 
Judges and legal practitioners often focus on ‘how to find the applicable law’ without much interest in 
‘why the law says what it says’.52 National and international law-makers and legal researchers, by 
contrast, often focus on legal policy questions that require exploring ‘law in context’ in order to 
understand why legal rules may operate and affect pople differently depending on their social and 
legal context. In order to learn from such ‘why questions’ and use law as an efficient policy 
instrument, economic analyses of 'market failures' and ‘public choice’ analyses of 'governance failures' 
in IEL must be supplemented by ‘constitutional choie’ analyses of 'constitutional failures' and 
‘comparative institutional economics’ evaluating alternative decision-making processes, like citizen-
driven market processes, political processes, judicial procedures and regulatory interventions (e.g. 
based on the diverse competition law systems in North-America and Europe). One major objective of 
protecting cosmopolitan rights (e.g. in competition a d common market regulation) is to empower 
citizens – as the ‘democratic principals’ – to exercise control over their agents based on legal and 
judicial remedies against the ubiquitous abuses of delegated powers to regulate international economic 
transactions. Arguably, cosmopolitan rights serve not only utilitarian functions (like promoting 
efficient economic exchanges) but also constitutional functions protecting cosmopolitan and 
democratic self-development rather than merely natio l st citizen rights limited by welfare-reducing 
border discrimination.53 ‘Constitutional economics’ explains why long-term constitutional rules of a 
higher legal rank (e.g. in EU competition and common market rules) are important for limiting rule-
making, administrative and judicial powers for the b nefit of citizens and of their constitutional 
rights.54 Economic analysis of law and ‘public choice theoris’ examine the comparative costs and 
benefits of ‘institutional choices’ between alternative decision-making processes such as decentralized 
markets, majoritarian political processes and non-majoritarian decision-making by independent 
regulatory agencies and ‘courts of justice’. ‘Welfare economics’ focuses on the regulation of ‘market 
failures’. ‘Public choice economics’ focuses on regulating political ‘governance failures’ resulting, 
inter alia, from political collusion between rent-seeking interest groups and periodically elected 
politicians (e.g. US Congressmen depending on political and financial support from local 
constituencies). Comparative institutional analysis completes the economic analysis of law and public 
policies by comparing and evaluating the decision-making alternatives used in diverse institutional 
systems (eg, diverse national and regional regulatory gencies and UN Specialized Agencies).55 
Comparative ‘Systems-Analyses’: Lessons from the Transformation of International Investment 
Law? 
Comparative research is also necessary for exploring under which conditions legal practices and 
‘jurisprudence’ developed in one legal regime may assist in reforming another legal regime or 
enabling a ‘paradigm change’ in economic regulation, as it happened in diverse ways in regional 
economic law (e.g. due to the jurisprudence of the EU Court and EFTA Court). For instance, are there 
political lessons from the dynamic evolution of international investment law for similar cosmopolitan 
reforms in other fields of IEL? Until the judgment by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 
ELSI dispute56, most international investment disputes were decided either by recourse to domestic 
                                                   
52 M.McConveille/W.Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2007), at 2. 
53 On competing conceptions of ‘equal freedoms’ as ‘fir t principle of justice’ protecting negative as well as 
positive, national as well as cosmopolitan freedoms and human capacities see Petersmann (note 1), chapter 
III. 
54
 Cf. G.Brennan/J.M.Buchanan, The Reason of Rules. Constitutional Political Economy (Cambridge: CUP, 
1985). 
55 See also: D. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: CUP, 1990). 
56 United States v Italy, ELSI case, ICJ Reports 1989, 15.  
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courts or by diplomatic protection of the foreign investor by the home state which, occasionally, 
submitted the dispute to international courts like th ICJ or its predecessor, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. Yet, as illustrated by the ELSI judgment delivered by the ICJ more than 20 years 
after the dispute between the US investor and the local authorities in Sicily arose, most foreign 
investors perceive the prior exhaustion of local remedies in national courts and ‘politicized’, lengthy 
procedures of diplomatic protection and disputes among states in international courts as offering 
inadequate legal and judicial safeguards of investor rights. The transformation of international 
investment law from a ‘Westphalian’ into a more ‘cosmopolitan system’ evolved since the 1960s in 
essentially five phases: 
• Since the conclusion of the first bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between Germany and Pakistan 
in 1959, the number of BITs has dynamically increased to now more than 2’800 agreements. 
Yet, the ‘first generation BITs’ did not yet provide for direct access of the foreign investor to 
independent international arbitration. 
• The 1965 World Bank Convention establishing the Inter ational Center for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), which entered into force already in 1966 (following 20 
ratifications), offered a multilateral legal framework for institutionalized, transnational 
arbitration of investment disputes based on consent b tween the states and investors involved. 
The first ICSID disputes were based on investor-state contracts57 or on national legislation 
providing for direct access of foreign investors to international arbitration.58 
• Treaty-based investor-state arbitration was provided for only in the ‘second generation BITs’ 
concluded since about the 1970s. In view of its many dvantages for private investors (e.g. in 
terms of direct access to independent international arbitration usually without prior exhaustion of 
local remedies, direct control of the procedures without dependence on ‘diplomatic protection’, 
availability of institutionalized ICSID procedures), most modern BITs provide for treaty-based 
investor-state arbitration.59  
• In contrast to the less than 400 BITs concluded prior to 1989, the number of new BITs increased 
dramatically since the 1990s and approaches now 3’000 BITs or corresponding treaty provisions 
in free trade agreements (like NAFTA Chapter XI) and other sectorial agreements (like the 
Energy Charter Treaty which entered into force in 1998), including increasingly also BITs 
among LDCs.  
• Since the 1990s, also the number of treaty-based ICSID disputes, or investor-state disputes based 
on UNCITRAL or other commercial arbitration procedures, and the emergence of case-law 
referring to the today almost 400 known investor-state arbitral awards and related ‘annulment 
decisions’ or national court decisions as relevant precedents, increased dramatically. 
Foreign direct investments offer obvious economic advantages (e.g. in terms of transfer of capital and 
know-how) to the host state justifying legal ‘investment incentives’ compensating for the less secure 
legal status and potential discrimination of foreigners in the domestic legal system of host states. The 
‘political economy’ for the regulation of transnational movements of other natural and legal persons 
(like foreign workers, traders, portfolio investors, tourists, refugees) offers less incentives for host 
states to commit to multilevel guarantees of cosmopolitan and judicial remedies in transnational legal 
systems. Even most regional human rights courts offer individual access only after prior exhaustion of 
local judicial remedies. With only few exceptions (like the ‘domain name dispute settlement 
arbitration’ established in the context of the arbitrat on centre of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization, the ‘preshipment inspection arbitration’ established in the context of the WTO 
                                                   
57  The first ICSID dispute based on an investor-state contract was Holliday Inns v Morocco, ICSID Case No. 
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Agreement on Preshipment Inspection), ‘cosmopolitan dispute settlement institutions’ similar to 
institutionalized arbitration and its quasi-automatic enforceability in domestic legal systems (e.g. due 
to the ICSID Convention and, in case of commercial arbitration, the 1958 New York Convention on 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards) do not (yet) exist in most other fields of 
IEL. Nor are governments in most UN member states politically willing to submit to compulsory 
international jurisdiction for the protection of other cosmopolitan rights of citizens (eg, labour rights 
protected by ILO Conventions). Yet, this current reluctance of governments to limit their ‘Westphalian 
privileges’ (e.g. in terms of limited legal and judicial accountability vis-à-vis foreigners under WTO 
law) by additional legal and judicial guarantees of c smopolitan rights may change, for instance – as 
in the field of investment treaties - by recognition f individual legal and judicial remedies by 
international courts and the ever larger number of multilevel legal and judicial safeguards of 
cosmopolitan rights in regional economic integration agreements, human rights agreements and 
intellectual property conventions. 
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Cosmopolitan IEL Resulting from ‘Struggles for Rights’? 
The preceding survey has revealed a variety of competing, legal and normative conceptions of IEL and 
the need for respecting and coordinating the legitimate reality of ‘constitutional pluralism’ based on
‘heterarchy’ rather than hierarchy.60 As diplomats and other political actors often pursue narrow self-
interests (e.g. in avoiding legal and democratic accountability for their frequent neglect of consumer 
interests), the needed constitutional and cosmopolitan reforms of IEL are often triggered by ‘struggles 
for rights’ by citizens and their judicial protection by ‘courts of justice’ rather than by political 
institutions dominated by rent-seeking interest groups (including politicians lobbying for their re-
election). As illustrated by Mohammed Bouazizi, theyoung Tunisian street vendor whose protests 
against arbitrary market restrictions triggered Tunisia’s human rights revolution in 2011, arbitrary 
political oppression of individual economic freedom may justify a human rights revolution. According 
to Mohammed’s younger brother, the identification of millions of disempowered Arab people during 
the ‘Arab revolutionary spring 2011’ with the self-immolation of Bouazizi reflected a common 
suffering: ‘that the poor also have the right to buy and sell’61. Modern economics and theories of 
justice confirm that social welfare depends on reason ble rules and institutions protecting economic 
freedoms, property rights and non-discriminatory conditions of competition of citizens to engage in 
mutually beneficial division of labour, subject to legal constraints of ‘market failures’ as well as 
‘governance failures’. Just as the arbitrary confiscation of the merchandise and other means of trade 
owned by Bouazizi destroyed his private business and prospects of autonomous self-development, 
millions of protesters in the ‘Arab spring’ are challenging authoritarian, welfare-reducing government 
restrictions impeding individual and democratic self-d velopment and emancipation of the poor. 
Lessons from the Historical Evolution of IEL? 
Since ancient times, trade law (e.g. since the trade greements among ancient city republics in the 
Mediterranean), investment law (e.g. since the Italian city republics during the Renaissance) and 
cosmopolitan rights (e.g. since the American and French human rights revolutions/declarations during 
the 18th century) often evolved through antagonistic processes of unilateral, bilateral and multilaterl 
regulation. Arguably, these often dialectic rule-crating processes – not only inside human minds but 
also in social interactions - offer lessons for the modern experience that worldwide agreements (e.g. on 
trade, investment and environmental regulation) may often only be politically supported after prior 
tensions between unilateral, bilateral and regional regulation have revealed the necessity of additional 
multilateral coordination. 
Also commercial adjudication and modern arbitration law (e.g. the English Arbitration Act of 1996) 
originate in ancient dispute settlement usages (e.g. since the Roman praetor peregrinus, the English 
Arbitration Act of 1697) which, for instance in the constitutional instruments resulting from the 
French Revolution, led even to the proclamation of a constitutional right of citizens to resort to 
privately agreed arbitration. Coordination among the fragmented legal systems and jurisdictions was 
often promoted by national and international courts, like the thousands of judgments by the Imperial 
Chamber Court (Reichskammergericht) covering numerous countries and jurisdictions since the 16th 
century and the ever closer cooperation among national courts and transnational commercial 
arbitration (as administered, e.g., by the Internatio l Chamber of Commerce and regional courts of 
transnational arbitration in Paris, London or Stockholm) in the worldwide recognition and 
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enforcement of commercial arbitral awards (e.g. on the basis of the 1958 New York Convention) and 
investor-state arbitration (e.g. based on the 1965 ICSID Convention). Compulsory jurisdiction is 
increasingly accepted in regional economic and human rights agreements and in WTO law. But it 
remains contested in UN law, where only about one third of UN member states have accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. The thousands of disputes settled by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
at The Hague and by the UN Compensation Commission established after the first Iraq War (both 
institutions using the UNCITRAL arbitration rules) illustrate that even politically most sensitive 
disputes and mass claim adjudications can be resolvd on the basis of arbitration rules. Due to 
‘globalization’, the diverse private and public, national and international parts of IEL now interact in 
ever more complex and often contested ways. In spite of he legitimate diversity of judicial procedures 
in diverse jurisdictions62, the increasing cooperation among private and public, national and 
international courts entails the emergence of a transn tional ‘common law of adjudication’63 
demonstrating the political and legal feasibility of transnational rule of law with due respect for 
‘reasonable disagreement’ among jurisdictions based on ‘heterarchy’ rather than hierarchy.  
Development of Substantive IEL through Cooperation among Courts? 
Similar to the judicial development of ‘equity law’ in the English legal system, multilevel judicial 
cooperation and jurisprudence (e.g. by WTO dispute settlement bodies) is progressively developing 
and transforming international trade, investment and regional economic integration law. For instance, 
regardless of whether commercial arbitration is conceived as (1) a component of the national legal 
order at the seat of arbitration (assimilating the arbitrator to a national judge), as (2) being anchored in 
a plurality of national legal orders (e.g. of all states recognizing and enforcing the arbitration award) or 
as (3) a transnational arbitral legal order (e.g. being part of transnational commercial and investmen 
law), arbitrators and courts increasingly interpret their powers to adjudicate, the applicable rules and
procedures governing the arbitration process and the legal effects of the award with due respect not 
only for the legal autonomy of the parties and of the arbitrators, but also for the interrelationships of 
the national and international legal systems involved and for legitimately diverse legal conceptions of 
international arbitration.64 Most ICSID tribunals no longer perceive themselves as exclusively ‘private 
dispute resolution service providers’ referring only to arguments presented by the parties to the 
dispute. Due also to the judicial review by ICSID annulment committees, arbitrators increasingly 
acknowledge the ‘public law dimensions’ of investor-state disputes; they also make their own 
independent, legal assessments following the maxim of jus novit curia, according to which a court 
should – of its own motion – apply rules of law relevant to the facts and to the dispute resolution, even 
if the applicable rule of law has not been explicitly pleaded (except for ‘exception clauses’ whose 
invocation remains within the discretion of the parties to the dispute).65 Hence, investment tribunals 
                                                   
62 See, e.g., L.B.Solum, Procedural Justice (University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research 
Paper Series: Working Paper 2, 2004), who distinguishes between an ‘accuracy model’ (assuming that the 
aim of dispute resolution is correct application of the law to the facts), a ‘balancing model’ (assuming that the 
aim of dispute settlement procedures is to strike a fair balance between the costs and benefits of 
adjudication), and a ‘participation model’ of dispute settlement (assuming that the very idea of a corre t 
outcome must be understood as a function of process that guarantees fair and equal participation). As it i
usually a condition for the fairness of a dispute settlement procedure that those who are to be finally bound 
shall have a reasonable opportunity to participate in the proceedings, the ‘participation principle’ rquires 
rights of participation (e.g. in the form of notice and opportunity to be heard) that must be satisfied in order 
for a procedure to be considered fair. 
63 C.Brown, A Common Law of International Adjudication (Oxford: OUP, 2007); idem, The Cross-Fertilization 
of Principles Relating to Procedures and Remedies in the Jurisprudence of International Courts and 
Tribunals, in: Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 30 (2008), 219-246. 
64 Cf. E.Gaillard, Legal Theory of International Arbitration (Leiden: Nijhoff Publishers, 2010). 
65 On the two types of ‘dispute-oriented tribunals’ and ‘legislator-oriented tribunals’ see: O.K.Fouchald, Legal 
Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals: An Empirical Analysis, in: EJIL 19 (2008), 301-364. 
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have challenged both private claims focusing one-sid dly on cosmopolitan investor rights as well as 
government claims that tribunals must always defer to government discretion and to intergovernmental 
interpretations limiting the jurisdiction of tribunals even retroactively in pending investment 
disputes.66 In EDF Services v Romania (2009), the arbitral tribunal rightly interpreted the ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’ (FET) standard by emphasizing: 
‘The idea that legitimate expectations, and therefore FET, imply the stability of the legal and busines 
framework, may not be correct if stated in an overly-b oad and unqualified formulation. The FET 
might then mean the virtual freezing of the legal regulation of economic activities, in contrast with the
State’s normal regulatory power and the evolutionary character of economic life. Except where 
specific promises or representations are made by the S ate to the investor, the latter may not rely on a 
bilateral investment treaty as a kind of insurance policy against the risk of any changes in the host 
State’s legal and economic framework. Such expectation would be neither legitimate nor 
reasonable.’67 
The increasing ‘multilevel judicial dialogues’ – for instance among national courts and the EU Court 
of Justice (ECJ), the EFTA Court, other regional economic and human rights courts, or among ICSID 
arbitral panels and ICSID annulment committees, commercial arbitral tribunals and national courts – 
prompt ever more adjudicators to acknowledge the need for ‘balancing’ all public and private interests 
involved rather than defining the relevant ‘epistemic community’ in narrow nationalist or commercial 
terms.68 Similar to the function of laboratories in natural sciences, comparative law, ‘judicial 
dialogues’ and ‘judicial comity’ among courts from different jurisdictions can promote legal reforms 
by identifying ‘best practices’ and ‘general principles’ common to diverse legal systems.69 For 
instance, the 2005 Mangold judgement by the EU Court of Justice on age discrimination in 
employment - which was widely criticized for exceeding the borderline separating law from policy - 
was reluctantly accepted by the German Constitutional Court as a ‘methodologically justifiable 
development of the law’70; such conditional cooperation among supreme courts illustrates that the 
validity and legitimacy of legal rules may depend no less on respect for legitimately diverse legal 
methodologies than on the outcome of judicial decisions. 
 
 
                                                   
66 See the ‘Interpretive Note’ issued by the NAFTA Federal Trade Commission on 31 July 2001 in order to limit 
the judicial articulation of stricter standards by NAFTA investment tribunals: ‘The concepts of “fair and 
equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that 
which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens’. 
67 EDF (Services) Ltd v Romania, ICSID Arbitral Award of 8 October 2009 (Case No ARB/05/13), at para. 217. 
68 Cf. P.M.Haas, Introduction : Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, in : International 
Organizations 46 (1992), at 1 ff, who defined an epistemic community as ‘a network of professionals with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area’.   
69 For examples see the numerous case-studies in: F.Fontanelli/G.Martinico/P.Carozza (eds), Shaping Rule of 
Law Through Dialogue (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2009), including my Introduction to this book: 
E.U.Petersmann, ‘Constitutional Justice’ Requires Judicial Cooperation and ‘Comity’ in the Protection f 
‘Rule of Law’, at 1-19. 
70 Case C-144/04 Mangold ECR 2005 I-9981; BVerfGE 2 BvR 2661/06 of 6 July 2010 (‘Dem Gerichtshof ist 
auch die Rechtsfortbildung im Wege methodisch gebundener Rechtsfortbildung nicht verwehrt’).  
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IEL as a 'Struggle of Citizens' for Cosmopolitan Rights? 
F.Fukuyama's recent book on The Origins of Political Order71 explains the evolution of the modern 
'rule of law state' as an antagonistic learning process triggered by increasing limitation of political 
powers and of their 'rule by law' through competing religious, civil and political powers insisting on 
transnational 'rule of law' (e.g. Roman law and ecclesiastical law as jus commune in Medieval 
Europe). Almost a century ago, the German jurist R.Jhering noted that the 'life of the law’ often 
depends on citizens struggling for their rights; such ‘struggle for his rights’ may be a ‘duty of the 
person whose rights have been violated' as well as a 'duty to society'.72 Both in US antitrust law as well 
as in European economic law, individual plaintiffs invoking and enforcing common market and 
competition rules have been likened to the function of an ‘attorney general’ promoting ‘community 
interests’ rather than pursuing only individual self-interests.73 Following the post-war recognition of 
human rights and other ‘principles of justice’ as integral parts of national and international legal 
systems, ever more national and international courts th oughout Europe have interpreted international 
guarantees of freedom, non-discrimination and rule of law for the benefit of citizens even if the 
international rules were addressed to states without explicitly providing for cosmopolitan rights: 
‘the fact that certain provisions of the Treaty areformally addressed to the Member States does not 
prevent rights from being conferred at the same time on any individual who has an interest in 
compliance with the obligations thus laid down (see Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455, 
par. 31). Such consideration must, a fortiori, be applicable to Article 48 of the Treaty, which … is 
designed to ensure that there is no discrimination on the labour market’.74 
Arguably, the increasing legal and judicial guarantees of ‘access to justice’75 and of cosmopolitan 
rights offer similar instruments in the hands of individuals to enforce IEL in decentralized and de-
politicized ways against illegal government restrictions. The need for legal and judicial ‘balancing’ of 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural human rights makes ‘constitutional justice’ (e.g. 
multilevel constitutional protection of equal freedoms and human rights) and multilevel judicial 
protection of transnational rule of law on the basis of ‘legal balancing’ the ‘ultimate rule of law’.76 
This is also true for IEL reconciling economic freedoms with non-economic rights and public interests 
subject to requirements of transparency, non-discrimination, ‘suitability’, necessity, ‘proportionality 
stricto sensu’ and legal accountability. Examples include: 
• the reconciliation of human rights and IEL in the jurisprudence and ‘balancing methods’ of 
national and European Courts, and increasingly alsoin international investment law77 and 
regional economic integration law beyond Europe;78  
                                                   
71 F.Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order. From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (Profils Books, 
2011). 
72 R. Jhering, The Struggle for Law (Chicago: Callaghan, 1915), chapters II to IV. A similar ‘natural duty of 
justice’ requiring citizens ‘to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us … (and) 
to further just arrangements not yet established’ is emphasized by Rawls (note 20), at 115, 246, 334. 
73 This conception was emphasized by the ECJ in its Van Gend en Loos judgment (Case 26/62, ECR 1963, 1), 
where the ECJ stated that ‘the vigilance of the indiv duals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an 
effective supervision in addition to the supervision entrusted by (ex) Articles 169 and 170 to the diligence of 
the Commission and the Member States’.  
74 Cf. Case C-281/98, Angonese [2000] ECR I-4139.  
75 Examples include Article 8 UDHR, Article 13 ECHR, Art.47 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Arts. 3 and 7 
African Charter of Human and People’s Rights, Arts. 8 and 25 Inter-American Charter of Human Rights; cf. 
F.Francioni (ed), Access to Justice as a Human Right (Oxford: OUP, 2007).  
76 Cf. D.M.Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: OUP, 2004). 
77 See note 25 above. 
78 See E.U.Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and ‘Constitutional Justice’, in: EJIL 19 
(2008), 769-798.  
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• the development of the customary international law rules for the protection of aliens, which 
require states to provide decent justice to foreignrs and ‘to create and maintain a system of 
justice which ensures that unfairness to foreigners either does not happen, or is corrected’79, into 
ever more comprehensive judicial remedies in IEL; and   
• the progressive ‘multilateralization’ of bilaterally agreed protection standards in the more than 
2,800 BITs through hundreds of investor-state arbitral awards and related judicial decisions by, 
e.g., ICSID annulment committees and national courts reviewing and enforcing arbitral awards 
on the basis of internationally agreed standards (e.g. in the 1965 ICSID Convention, the 1958 
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards). 
 
Table 1: Judicialization and Multilateralization of  Investment Disputes 
• In contrast to the very limited number of international investment disputes among states in the ICJ, its 
predecessor (the PCIJ) and in the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, the hundreds of 
national and international arbitral awards, court decisions, ICSID annulment decisions and other 
judgments by specialized dispute settlement bodies (e.g. the Iran-US Claims Tribunal) deciding 
investor-state disputes and enforcing arbitration awards continue to clarify and develop international 
investment law on the basis of a de facto system of judicial precedents and ‘judicial dialogues’.  
• The increasing convergence of objectives, structures and protection standards in BITs (e.g. national 
treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment, fair andequitable treatment, full protection and security, 
protection against direct and indirect expropriation, umbrella clauses transforming contract claims into
treaty claims, capital transfer and dispute settlement provisions) and their non-discriminatory 
application by governments and adjudicators promote ‘multilateralization’ of rather uniform investment 
law principles. 
• Investor-state arbitrators, BITs and ICSID increasingly promote transparency of arbitration proceedings 
and of arbitral awards and ‘reasonable regard’ to third-party interests affected by the arbitration (e.g. by 
accepting amicus curiae briefs and engaging in ‘proportionality balancing’). 
 
 
                                                   
79 J. Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2005), at 7, 36. 
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Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Protection of ‘Cosmopolitan IEL? 
In the 21st century, the legitimacy of law derives from democratic consent of citizens rather than from 
authoritarian claims of rulers and their diplomats. The preceding analyses suggest that - even though 
human rights and constitutional principles say little about the optimal design of IEL and legal 
institutions (such as independent regulatory agencies) - comparative institutional analyses reveal that 
rights-based ‘cosmopolitan regimes’ in transnational commercial, trade, investment and regional 
economic and environmental law reconcile private and public interests in protection of interdependent 
public goods more effectively and more legitimately than state-centred ‘Westphalian regimes’ (cf. 
Table 2). History is replete of authoritarian government decisions invoking ‘state interests’ in order to 
curtail the human rights of their citizens. Yet, as illustrated by the current banking and financial crises 
in the EU and the USA, even in constitutional democracies does limitation of ‘market failures’ as well 
as of ‘governance failures’ remain a perennial regulatory task. National governance systems and 
economic regulation (e.g. of ‘Islamic banking’) will continue to legitimately differ depending on the 
respective constitutional traditions of people. History and comparative research suggest that protecting 
international public goods requires ‘bottom-up strengthening’ of constitutional and cosmopolitan 
rights of citizens and their democratic representatives against abuses of intergovernmental 
‘Westphalian governance’ colluding with rent-seeking i terest groups to the detriment of general 
consumer welfare and cosmopolitan rights of citizens.  




focuses on reciprocal rights/obligations among ‘sovereign states’ and separation of 
international from national legal systems, usually (e.g. in UN law) without compulsory 
jurisdiction for peaceful settlement of disputes; the reatment of citizens as mere objects, 
the lack of effective protection of ‘transnational ru e of law’ and of human rights, and 
ineffective  parliamentary and democratic control of UN law in many states undermine the 
moral and democratic legitimacy of ‘Westphalian inter ational law’. 
 
Cosmopolitan IEL focuses on rights and obligations of individuals and their multilevel legal and judicial 
protection across national frontiers (e.g. in transnational investment law); it protects 
transnational rule of law and strengthens the ‘constitutional  limits’ of state sovereignty, 
popular sovereignty and ‘constitutional justice’, for instance in regional EU law, EEA law 
and the ECHR. 
 
EU law integrates international and national, legal and judicial guarantees of  common market 
freedoms, transnational rule of law, human rights and other cosmopolitan rights on the 
basis of multilevel constitutional principles (e.g. of legal primacy, direct effect and direct 
applicability of EU legal rules) and EU institutions. 
 
EEA law integrates international and national, legal and judicial guarantees of Common market 
freedoms, transnational rule of law, human rights and other cosmopolitan rights on the 
basis of more deferential constitutional principles ( .g. of quasi-primacy and quasi-‘direct 
applicability’ of EEA rules after their incorporation into domestic law) and EEA 
institutions. 
 
ECHR law has evolved into a multilevel legal and judicial system protecting human  rights and access 
to justice in the legal and judicial systems of the 47 member states for the benefit of more 
than 800 million citizens. 
 




continues to evolve into cosmopolitan commercial, investment and arbitration law with 
multilevel judicial protection of individual freedoms (e.g. of contract), property rights and 
transnational rule of law empowering citizens. 
 
Need for Empirical Case-Studies of ‘Judicial Reforms’ of IEL 
Most IEL specialists find it ever more difficult tof llow the hundreds of dispute settlement reports by, 
e.g., the WTO Appellate Body, WTO dispute settlement panels and investment arbitration awards, and 
the thousands of judgments by regional economic and human rights courts relating to interpretation of 
economic rules. In European economic law, the ‘judicial constitutionalization’ of intergovernmental 
economic regulation for the benefit of citizens and of their constitutional rights was progressively 
accepted and incorporated into legislation by natiol parliaments and governments in EU and EEA 
member states. Arguably (cf. Table 3), the multilevel judicial protection of ‘cosmopolitan rights’ (e.g. 
investor rights derived from BITs) and increasing re ard to human rights obligations of governments 
render regional economic and investment law and jurisprudence more consistent with human rights 
compared with the prevailing ‘Westphalian conceptions’ of IEL in ‘inter-state’ adjudication (e.g. in 
the ICJ, WTO dispute settlement bodies), notwithstanding the lack of explicit references in most BITs 
to human rights and investor responsibilities.  The on -sided focus of BITs on protection of vaguely 
formulated investor rights has prompted some countries o withdraw from the ICSID Convention (like 
Bolivia and Venezuela) or to refrain from providing for investor-state arbitration in future economic 
agreements (like Australia). Other countries have responded by providing for ‘general exceptions’ and 
appellate review procedures in their ‘new generation BITs’ (like Canada and the USA) or by 
encouraging ICSID annulment proceedings to admit – as stated by the 2010 ICSID ad hoc Committee 
annulling the award in Sempra v Argentina - ‘that a manifest error of law may, in an exceptional 
situation, be of such egregious nature as to amount t  a manifest excess of powers’.80 The fact that 
judicial decisions and scholarly opinions have become the most frequently used interpretive arguments 
in ICSID jurisprudence illustrates the primary role f judges and jurisprudence in the ‘recognition’ ad 
interpretation of the general principles and standards characteristic of modern investment law. Yet, the 
legitimacy of some investment tribunals continues to be undermined by the non-publication of arbitral 
awards and the confidentiality and lack of transparency of arbitral procedures. The ECJ’s case-law on 
the inconsistency of EU member states’ BITs with EUlaw, and on the lack of standing of arbitral 
tribunals for requesting preliminary rulings from the ECJ, is influenced by this lack of transparency of 
investment arbitration and the fear that arbitrators may neglect or incorrectly apply EU law as relevant 
context for the settlement of commercial and investm nt disputes.81 
 
                                                   
80 According to this ICSID ad hoc Committee, the arbitrat on award amounted to a manifest excess of powers 
owing to the erroneous interpretation of the treaty-based emergency exception in terms of the customary law 
defence of necessity (as codified in Article 25 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility) rather than in 
terms of Article XI of the underlying BIT.  Previous ICSID jurisprudence had excluded the erroneous 
application of the proper law as a valid reason for annulment, cf. I.Marboe, ICSID Annulment Decisions: 
Three Generations Revisited, in: Binder/Kriebaum/Reinisch/Wittich (eds), International Investment Law for 
the 21st Century. Essays in Honour of C.Schreuer (Oxford: OUP, 2009), at 200-220; K.P.Sauvant (ed), 
Appeals Mechanisms in International Investment Disputes (Oxford: OUP, 2008). 
81 On the new EU investment policy competence under Article 207 TFEU, the relevant ECJ jurisprudence, th 
amicus curiae briefs submitted by the EU Commission in investor-state arbitration proceedings inside the 
EU, and the EU proposals for terminating intra-EU BITs among EU member states see: M.Bungenberg/ 
J.Griebel/S.Hindeland (eds), International Investment Law and EU Law (Heidelberg: Springer, 2011); 




Table 3: Judicial ‘Proportionality Balancing’ of Public Interests and Individual Rights 
Promoting ‘Constitutionalization’ of Investment Law 
 
• Principles used by tribunals for resolving jurisdictional overlaps include, inter alia, ‘lis pendens’, 
‘ res judicata’, comity, ‘forum non conveniens’, ‘fork in the road preclusion’ (electa una via), joinder or 
de facto consolidation of different claims, agreed settlement of disputes, voluntary waiver of the right to 
initiate proceedings, agreed designation of a specific forum, or withdrawal of consent to a certain dispute 
settlement mechanism.82 
 
• Principles used by tribunals for deciding whether a egulatory activity (e.g. by a government-owned 
corporation) can be ‘attributed’ to the State (in terms of state responsibility) include, inter alia: formal 
authority to exercise public power; functional exercise of government power; private action under 
governmental control and instructions; agreed lex specialis rules (e.g. ‘umbrella clauses’) in BITs; State 
failure to grant ‘full protection and security’ and prevent ‘denial of justice’.83 
 
• On ‘balancing’ of competing ‘development dimensions’ see Lemire v Ukraine (2010): ‘Economic 
development is an objective which must benefit all,primarily national citizens and companies, and 
secondarily foreign investors. Thus, the object and purpose of the Treaty is not to protect foreign 
investments per se, but as an aid to the development of the domestic conomy. And local development 
requires that the preferential treatment of foreignrs be balanced against the legitimate right of Ukraine to 
pass legislation and adopt measures for the protecti n of what as a sovereign it perceives to be its public 
interest.’84 
 
• Principles for examining ‘indirect expropriation’ include, inter alia: ‘non-discriminatory treatment’ and 
‘regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process’ without impairing 
‘specific commitments’ by the government to the foreign investor; ‘fair and equitable treatment’ (FET); 
‘interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in 
significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not 
necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State’85; ‘substantial deprivation’ or permanent 
‘disappearance’ of the economic value of the investor’  property; legitimate public interests; ‘fair balance’ 
or ‘proportionality balancing’ of public and private interests involved.86 
 
                                                   
82 For case-examples see, e.g., L.Guglya, The Interplay of International Dispute Resolution Mechanisms : the 
Softwood Lumber Controversy, in : Journal of International Dispute Settlement 2 (2011), 175-207. 
83 For case-examples see: A.Mills, Antinomies of Public and Private at the Foundations of International 
Investment Law and Arbitration, in: JIEL 14 (2011), 469 ff, at 500-502. 
84 Lemire v Ukraine, ICSID Award on Jurisdiction of 14 January 2010 (Case No ARB/06/18), para. 273. 
85 Metalclad v Mexico, ICSID Final Award of 30 August 2000 (Case No ARB/97/1), 40 ILM 36, para. 103. 
86 Cf. LG&E v Argentina, ICSID Award of 3 October 2006 (Case No ARB/02/1), at para. 194: ‘The question 
remains as to whether one should only take into accunt the effects produced by the measure or if one should 
consider also the context within which a measure was adopted and the host State’s purpose. It is this 
Tribunal’s opinion that there must be a balance in the analysis both of the causes and the effects of a measure 
in order that one may qualify a measure as being of an expropriatory nature. It is important not to confound 
the State’s right to adopt policies with its power to take an expropriatory measure’. On the competing ‘public 
purpose’-, ‘police powers’- and ‘effects-doctrines’ in the relevant case-law see: U. Kriebaum, Regulatory 
Takings: Balancing the Interests of the Investor and the State, in: Journal of World Investment and Trade 8 
(2007), 717-744 ; P.M. Dupuy/F. Francioni/E.U. Petersmann (eds), Human Rights in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford: OUP, 2009). 
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• Even though most BITs do not refer to human rights, uman rights are increasingly being raised in 
investment treaty lawsuits by host states, investors, third parties or judges in order to justify governmental 
restrictions or ‘affirmative action policies’, investment treaty breaches, protection of investor rights or 
interpretations of investment rules (e.g. on FET, ‘protection and security’ obligations, a ‘state of 
necessity’, ‘public order’, ‘just compensation’) in conformity with human rights of third parties (such as 
rights of access to water, essential medicines and information, rights of indigenous people). Due to their 
different procedures, jurisdictions and applicable laws, investment and human rights tribunals risk 
resolving ‘overlapping disputes’ (e.g. over property expropriations, denial of justice, due process claims, 




'Democratic Functions' of Judicial ‘System-Building’? 
By interpreting, clarifying and progressively developing the contested meaning of rules and principles, 
judicial decisions narrow the scope of competing interpretations, produce legal effects and stabilize 
normative expectations beyond individual disputes, a  acknowledged in Article 38 ICJ Statute 
(referring to judicial decisions as ‘subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law’). From the 
perspective of human rights and ‘constitutional democracy’, judicial protection of human rights and 
other cosmopolitan rights – like judicial review of the ‘constitutionality’ of majority legislation and of 
administrative decisions – can serve ‘democratic functions’ and limit democratic deficits in 
intergovernmental rule-making and specialized economic organizations that often elude effective 
parliamentary control and are dominated by vested interest groups. Empirical studies confirm that 
most national parliaments no longer effectively contr l many developments of IEL, notably the 
obvious ‘governance failures’ to protect general citizen interests in enhancing consumer welfare 
through open ‘social market economies’ based on non-discriminatory conditions of competition, 
monetary stability, respect for human rights and transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens. 
Hence, the less ‘majoritarian democracies’ control intergovernmental rule-making in IEL, the less 
convincing becomes communitarian criticism that judicial clarification of the contested meaning of 
human rights and IEL principles amounts to undemocratic ‘judge-made law’. International law 
promotes governmental acceptance and implementation of judicial decisions by providing for 
international surveillance of domestic compliance with international legal and judicial obligations, for 
instance by worldwide institutions (such as the WTO Dispute Settlement Body adopting and 
supervising domestic implementation of WTO dispute settlement rulings) and regional institutions 
(like the EU Commission as guardian of rule of law inside the EU, the Council of Europe’s Council of 
Ministers supervising the enforcement of judgements by the European Court of Human Rights). 
Judicial precedents and citations - not only of the legally binding ratio decidendi, but also of non-
binding obiter dicta of national and international judgments (e.g. in their judicial balancing and 
‘proportionality analyses’) – influence ‘public reason’, law-making and administrative decisions in 
IEL and human rights law. 
                                                   
87 For overviews of the relevant case-law (like Mondev v USA, Tecmed v Mexico, Azurix v Argentina, CMS Gas 
Transmission Company v Argentina, Grand River Enterprises v USA, Glamis Gold Ltd v USA, etc) see: 
Dupuy/Francioni/Petersmann (note 84); L.E.Peterson, Human Rights and Bilateral Investment Treaties. 
Mapping the role of human rights law within investor-state arbitration (Rights & Democracy: Montreal, 
2009). The pertinent ISCID jurisprudence is also influenced by the different roles of host states, foreign 
investors and third parties (e.g. as perpetrators or victims of human rights violations) and the divers  legal 
contexts; in Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd v Ghana (UNCITRAL Award of 27 October 1989, 95 
ILR 184), for instance, Ghana had neither ratified the ICCPR nor the African Convention on Human Rights.     
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The legal limitation of political governance by ever stronger, multilevel judicial governance clarifying 
and adjusting specific rules influences also the systemic development of IEL (e.g. WTO law, 
investment law, regional economic law) and of human rights agreements and their domestic 
implementation. Notwithstanding the lack of legally binding precedents (stare decisis), the 
comprehensive jurisprudence by the WTO Appellate Body, ICSID arbitration and annulment awards, 
EU and EFTA Court judgments and the ECtHR (e.g. its ‘pilot judgments’) promotes ‘principled 
coherence’ and ‘judicial dialogues’ (e.g. on standard-setting precedents) in multilevel judicial 
protection of cosmopolitan rights and ‘judicial balancing methods’.88 From a constitutional perspective 
focusing on deliberative and rights-based democracy, such ‘judicial rule-clarification’ may be no less 
justifiable for clarifying ‘incomplete agreements’ and promoting ‘public reason’ in legal 
interpretations of vaguely formulated, general principles (such as ‘national treatment’, ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’, ‘full protection and security’ of foreign investors, sovereign rights to protect 
‘public morals’ and ‘public order’) than legislative and administrative rulemaking. Judicial decisions – 
provided they are justified convincingly, transparently, with due regard to all interests affected, and in 
language that remains comprehensible for ordinary citizens (e.g. avoiding WTO panel reports with 
more than 1’000 pages of legal findings drafted in technical WTO jargon) – are essential for protecting 
constitutional rights of citizens and transnational rule of law vis-à-vis the ubiquity of abuses of power 
in IEL. The more intergovernmental rulemaking (e.g. in the WTO, BITs, UN environmental 
negotiations, EU violations of WTO obligations) continues to neglect human rights and consumer 
welfare in IEL, the more may ‘dynamic’ and ‘systemic’ judicial interpretations and judicial 
‘balancing’ of economic and non-economic interests contribute to legal protection of cosmopolitan 
rights as required by customary international law. Even if WTO rules, BITs, arbitration agreements 
and certain other areas of IEL fail to specifically mention human rights and consumer welfare, the 
customary methods of legal interpretation and the modern reality of ‘overlapping legal pluralism’ 
justify interpreting the inherent powers of national and international judges broadly so as to protect all 
affected interests and human rights more effectively. 
                                                   
88 Cf. S.W.Schill, System-Building in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Lawmaking, in : German Law Journal 
12 (2011), 1083-1110. 
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IEL and Reasonable Disagreement 
From the perspective of democratic discourse treating citizens as free and equal, national and 
international legal systems may be perceived as constitutionally structured forms of agreed law-
creation requiring legal and judicial protection of equal freedoms.89 Globalizations and its increasing 
interconnection of national and international legal regimes (eg, for judicial settlement of disputes) 
promote both ‘centrifugal legal reforms’ (eg, by legal empowerment of non-state actors creating 
special legal regimes) as well as ‘legal integration’ (eg, due to universal human rights obligations, 
universal membership in the UN, UN Specialized Agenci s and increasingly also in the WTO). The 
coexistence of non-hierarchical, transnational legal orders and the increasing civil society claims  for 
cosmopolitan rights protecting individual and democrati  self-government beyond state borders give 
rise to a new ‘global legal pluralism’ challenging state-centred conceptions of international law and 
‘sovereigntist legal interpretations’. Reasonable citizens with legitimately diverse conceptions for a 
good life and ‘social justice’ often also reasonably disagree among themselves on how distributive 
justice, corrective justice, commutative justice or ‘equity’ and ‘transitional justice’ should be realized 
in economic regulation inside ‘well-ordered societies’ as well as in transnational, power-oriented 
relations. Even though philosophical reflection on the nature of law, justice and ‘governance by law’ is 
as old as philosophy itself, neither legal practitioners nor academics agree on a single theory and 
methodology of international law and IEL. Just as this reality of ‘methodological pluralism’ will 
continue to be criticized, so will cosmopolitan coneptions of IEL, like rights-based conceptions of 
democracy, remain contested, for instance by proponents of majoritarian democracy and of 'rational 
choice' theories prioritizing pursuit of rational self-interests over 'reasonable' regard to, and 'balancing' 
of, cosmopolitan interests. Reasonable disagreement ov r the value premises of IEL is likely to remain 
a permanent fact of life that tends to be respected in most IEL treaties explicitly (e.g. in their 'public 
interest clauses' reserving sovereign rights to restrict market access commitments and property rights 
on grounds of protection of non-economic public interests) or implicitly (e.g. as being implied in the 
customary requirement of interpreting treaties ‘in conformity with principles of justice’ and human 
rights). Also at national levels of legal regulation, some societies will continue defining democracy in 
terms of ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ (as in England) or prioritize civil and political constitutional 
rights over economic and social ‘common law freedoms’ (as in the USA); other societies are likely to 
continue prioritizing economic and social rights (ain China) or, as in Germany, prioritize ‘individual 
sovereignty’ through constitutional protection of ‘maximum equal liberties’ (including ‘positive 
liberties’ and welfare rights) in view of the historical experience of Germany’s ‘Weimar Republic’ that 
parliaments might delegate powers to a dictator suppressing both constitutional rights and democratic 
self-governance. In view of this legitimate reality of ‘constitutional pluralism’ as well as of 
‘methodological pluralism’ in IEL research, legal scholarship should reveal its normative 
preconceptions and choice of legal methods rather than pretending to have found ‘the one and only 
right answer to a legal problem’.90 
In contrast to the claims by the German philosophers Hegel and Marx, neither the nation state nor 
communist ideology have brought about ‘the end of history’. All UN member states have committed 
themselves to the need to protect global public goods. Yet, UN law and policies continue to be 
dominated by ‘Westphalian conceptions’ of ‘international law among sovereign states’ that obviously 
fail to protect global public goods effectively – like an efficient world trading and financial system, 
prevention of greenhouse-gas emissions, poverty reduction and universal fulfilment of human rights. 
                                                   
89 Cf. D. Nelken (ed), Law as Communication (Oxford: OUP, 1996). 
90 Cf. R. van Gestel/H.W.Micklitz, Revitalizing Doctrinal Legal Research in Europe: What About Methodology? 
in: U.Neergard/R.Nielsen/L.Roseberry (eds), European Legal Method – Paradoxes and Revitalization (DJOF 
Publishing, Copenhagen, 2011), 25, at 33. G.Shaffer (note 32) likewise concludes that there is no single 
‘correct approach’ to IEL scholarship. 
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Globalization increasingly transforms national constitutions into ‘partial constitutions’ that cannot 
unilaterally protect ‘aggregate public goods’ across national borders without respect for international 
law. The less effective ‘constitutional nationalism’ and ‘Westphalian intergovernmentalism’ realize 
their declared policy goals, the more it becomes necessary to acknowledge the need for multilevel 
constitutionalism based on respect for the reality of ‘constitutional pluralism’ (and its underlying 
‘value pluralism’) and ‘methodological pluralism’ in multilevel, legal limitations of ‘market failures’ 
as well as ‘governance failures’. The increasing interactions among national and international legal 
regimes require judges to settle disputes, promote utual coherence and protect legal security on the 
basis of common constitutional principles. Rather than pretending that textual, contextual and 
functional interpretation of economic rules may lead to ‘objectively true’ judgments, IEL scholarship 
and adjudication should respect reasonable disagreement in view of the fact that cosmopolitan moral 
and legal principles for relations among individuals, like moral and legal principles for international 
relations among states, are not governed by objectively existing ‘natural morons’ (R.Dworkin); hence, 
the value premises, preconceptions and methodological choices underlying IEL research should be 
explicitly revealed and justified in the light of ‘public reason’. Contrary to pretentious claims that 
‘doctrinal legal research is dead’ (E.Posner) and ‘black letter legal research’ should be buried, legal 
methodology and doctrinal research in IEL need to be ‘revitalized’ in order to resist the increasing 
‘instrumentalization of IEL’ for the benefit of powerful interest groups and the degeneration of IEL 
research into ‘case law journalism’ (P.Schlag).91 Conceptualizing IEL broadly as ‘integration law’ 
aimed at integrating private and public, national and international economic regulation for the benefit 
of citizens, their human rights and legitimate demands for protection of ‘global public goods’ is a 
doctrinal perspective that has hardly begun being explored by self-proclaimed ‘realist lawyers’, 
political scientists and economists. Fortunately, the antagonistic, unilateral, bilateral and multilater l 
efforts at institutionalizing public reason in IEL (e.g. in monetary regulation and governance in the 
Eurozone) remain subject to collective learning from ‘trial and error’ and changing conceptions of 
‘public reason’. 
 
                                                   
91 For a discussion of the citations see: van Gestel/Micklitz (note 90), at 25 ff.  

 
 
 
